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The legitimacy of modern states depends on the ability of democratic institutions to
reflect citizens preferences and values and on the state's abilioy to use technical expertise
competently. Legitimacy has a three-fold character based on rights, democratic
responsiveness, and competence. We argue that courts can help reconcile these competing
aspects of executive legitimacy. Our premise may seem implausible because courts are the
arche~pal "counter-majoritarian" institution, and judges ypicaly have little knowledge of
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technical subjects. However, based on a critical review of the law in the United States,
Canada, Itay, and France, we argue that courts can balance respect for democratic choice
and deference to experts with limited oversight that enhances legitimacy across all three
dimensions. We discuss the hazards of substantive review by technicaly illiterate courts
and argue that procedural review can be a partial substitute. If courts review rulemaking
they need to acknowledge its role in upholding policymaking values, and if they review
adjudications, they need to understand that court-like procedures are inadequate to capture
the broad policy issues often at stake. Based on our review of the four case studies, we
conclude that to further both democracy and competence, courts: (i) should review the
substance of the agencies' decisions under a weak reasonableness test and (ii) should
concentrate on the administrative process, notably by enforcing a widespread duty to give
reasons and by assuring generous rights ofparticipation.
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INTRODUCTION
An independent judiciary can be a check on democratic and
bureaucratic institutions. It can help enhance the legitimacy of the state by
constraining the behavior of politicians and officials in the interest of
fundamental values. Courts in modern democracies generally act as
bastions for the protection of individual rights. This is an important role,
but the legitimacy of modern states depends on more than the protection of
rights. It also depends on the ability of democratic institutions to reflect
citizens' preferences and values and on the state's ability to use technical
expertise competently. Legitimacy has a three-fold character based on
rights, democratic responsiveness, and competence.' Courts tend to
gravitate toward the protection of rights, and in some countries, the
1. SUSAN. ROSE-AcKERMAN, FROM ELECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY: BUILDING
ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT IN HUNGARY AND POLAND [hereinafter, FROM ELECTIONS
TO DEMOCRACY], 5-7 (2005); see also, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and Public Law in
Comparative Perspective, 60 UNtV. OF TORONTO LJ. 519 (2010). For a slightly different
trichotomy see Jerry L. Mashaw, Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Reflections on Balancing
Political, Managerial and Legal Accountability, 1 REvisTA DIREITO GV 153, 168 (2005)
(referencing political, managerial, and legal accountability). See also, Eduardo Jord~o, supra
note * (especially noting chapter 1.2).
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jurisdiction of constitutional courts is restricted to such cases. We argue
that courts can also play a constructive role in furthering both democracy
and competence. Our goal is to show how this can be done with reference
to four jurisdictions with different legal traditions and political regimes: the
United States, Canada, France, and Italy.
If modern states regulate complex technical areas, such as public utilities
and antitrust, it is unrealistic and unwise to require statutory texts to resolve
all the policy issues that will arise in practice. Statutes need to allow
agencies considerable discretion to set policy and to resolve individual cases
in line with their technical assessments.2 For this reason, concern for
democratic legitimacy does not end with the passage of regulatory statutes.
Rather, the agencies themselves need to operate under checks that assure
their transparency and accountability to the public.
There is no single way to balance democracy against expertise and the
protection of rights, but we argue that the courts can help reconcile the
competing aspects of executive legitimacy as a supplement to direct
intervention by the legislature or the cabinet. Our premise may seem
implausible because courts are the archetypal "counter-majoritarian"
institution, and judges typically have little knowledge of technical subjects
such as engineering or economics. However, we argue that courts can
balance respect for democratic choice and deference to experts with limited
oversight that enhances legitimacy on all three dimensions.
In some situations, courts do recognize that they can play a role beyond
the protection of rights. However, because that role is not always precisely
defined and constrained by statute or by constitution, courts may be at sea
in asserting authority. Without a framework, it is hardly surprising that
some courts are very deferential to the policy choices of the executive and
hold back. These courts look to their own lack of strong democratic
credentials to limit review. In contrast, other courts have become
increasingly strict in their review of agency actions in complex technical
areas, but they have done this, not by reference to democratic legitimacy,
but rather by invoking traditional administrative law norms based on rights.
These norms, we argue, although perfectly appropriate in many cases, are
not adequate to the review of many actions of regulatory agencies and
antitrust authorities. Even if the cases nominally involve conventional
rights-based challenges, their implications for policy and for state-society
2. We use the term "agency" as it is used in the United States to refer both to
executive departments under the President or a Cabinet Secretary, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency or the Occupational Health and Safety Administration in
the Department of Labor, and to independent agencies, such as the Federal
Communications Commission. In Europe, the term "agency" is usually reserved for
independent regulatory authorities.
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relations often go beyond claims that government actions violate individual
rights.
Managing the tension between deferring to technical expertise and
avoiding agency capture by narrow interests raises a different dilemma for
courts. Agencies that regulate a market must be able to take account of the
economic interests of the firms in the market. However, they also need to
hear from consumers, workers, competitors, policy analysts, and advocates
with no direct personal stake in the outcome. The agency is supposed to be
apolitical and well informed about the regulated industry. However,
especially for independent agencies insulated from the rest of government,
decisionmakers risk capture by the very interests they are supposed to be
regulating. Courts, then, can help prevent the worst instances of capture,
but if they are too aggressive, they risk substituting their own uninformed
and non-expert judgment for that of the agency. Judges need to be sure
that they do not invoke the protection of individual rights as an excuse for
imposing their policy preferences.
Courts need to strike a balance between deference to the expert choices
of specialized administrative bodies and review of those decisions to assure
that they are taken in a transparent and responsive way. Plaintiffs may
ground their arguments on rights violations; however, the courts also can
seek to assure that democratic values and competent expert advice infuse
administrative choices. Courts that take on this role can enhance, not
undermine, government legitimacy.
The law regulates the market in many different ways. Some statutes
depend entirely upon private individuals to bring lawsuits to defend their
rights; others delegate enforcement to a private entity whose members
police its behavior. We leave these options to one side and concentrate on
regulatory programs that require active government involvement. Within
that category, some statutes contain sufficient guidance to the
administration so that no executive policymaking is necessary. The agency
simply implements the law on a case-by-case basis in light of clear statutory
guidance. In such cases the only role for the courts is to police the agency
to be sure that it does not violate rights and to control for fraud and
maladministration. We ignore such cases on the ground that they seldom
describe the complex, fast-changing technical areas central to the modern
regulatory state that require policymaking delegation.
3
3. The justification for delegation in technically complex areas is usually based on the
claim that agencies have a comparative advantage over the legislature in: (i) expertise,
meaning not only specialized knowledge, but also experience--acquired through repeated
action-in the relevant area; and (ii) time, which the legislature lacks if decisions must be
made expeditiously.
2014]
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We focus on regulatory initiatives where both statutes and agency actions
determine policy. In the cases we discuss, regulatory policymaking is legally
permitted by delegation in a statute or through constitutional provisions.
Some agencies issue general norms-both rules with the force of law and
guidelines-to govern their actions in individual cases. Other agencies
make case-by-case enforcement decisions that over time produce de facto
policies in much the same way as the common law generates legal
principles.
4
Agency policymaking is not merely "legal" in a narrow formal sense.
Agencies combine technical expertise with democratic accountability to
produce policy.5 For example, most rules that govern air and water
pollution combine expert technical knowledge with a concern for citizens'
interest in a clean environment and take into account business objections to
high costs. Likewise, the vagueness of antitrust statutes often gives the
relevant authority considerable leeway to foster different types of social
goals, such as consumer welfare or economic freedom. Agencies may have
a choice of whether to implement a statute through rulemaking or
adjudication, and many do both-setting general policy through rules and
enforcing it in adjudications that themselves are exercises in judgment, not
just mechanical applications of the rules.
We discuss the hazards of substantive review by technically illiterate
courts and argue that procedural review can be a partial substitute that is
consistent with democratic legitimacy and regulatory competence. In
making this claim we, of course, recognize that the distinction between
substance and procedure is not always clear-cut. Nevertheless, review can
tilt in one or another direction, and we argue for a particular sort of
procedural oversight.
Our basic general point is that quasi-judicial processes that uphold the
rights of individuals in adjudications are not adequate to further competent
and democratically legitimate policymaking. If courts review rulemaking,
they need to acknowledge its role in upholding policymaking values, and if
they review adjudications, they need to understand that court-like
procedures are inadequate to capture the broad policy issues at stake in
4. See Paul v. B.C. (Atty Gen.) (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, 606
(Can.); France Houle & Lorne Sossin, Tribunals and Policy-Makng." From Legitimacy to Fairness, in
DIALOGUE BETWEEN COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: ESSAYS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND JUSTICE
123 (Laveme A.Jacobs & Anne L. Mactavish eds., 2008).
5. We use the term "rulemaking" in the American sense to mean secondary legislation
issued by agencies (both cabinet departments and independent agencies) under authority
delegated to them by statute, or, as in France, by the French Constitution itself. It is
equivalent to the terms "secondary legislation," "decree," and, with some caveats,
"ordinance."
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major adjudications involving regulated industries or antitrust violations.
Beyond any claimed rights violations, courts need to ask if agency actions
are consistent with democratic values and are competent, not as a legal
matter, but with respect to scientific and social-scientific expertise.
However, courts need to accept the reality that agencies are both more
technically competent than courts and more democratically accountable.
This is true even for so-called independent agencies; in every jurisdiction
studied they are less independent of the political branches than the courts.
6
Stringent judicial review of agency actions could lead the courts to usurp
the policymaking competence of the agencies. One response to this
concern is to deny jurisdiction to the courts to review policymaking in the
executive and to limit them to resolving rights violations arising in
individual cases. That would leave agency policymaking free of judicial
oversight and hence not subject to judicial policy biases. However, given
the weakness of legislative oversight, especially in technical, low-profile
areas, the risk of agency capture and bias is high. Judicial review can help
counter those tendencies, but it needs to be circumscribed to avoid the
countervailing problem ofjudicial policymaking.
Based on our review of the four case studies, we show how judicial
review can further both democracy and competence, while preserving the
protection of rights. Courts: (i) should only subject the substance of the
agencies' decisions to a weak reasonableness test; and (ii) should
concentrate on the administrative process, notably by enforcing a
widespread duty to give reasons and by assuring generous rights of
participation. To make that case, we discuss both substantive and
procedural review through a critical review of the law in Canada, the
United States, Italy, and France.
We begin with substantive review in Part I. For decisions involving
6. Some French commentators argue against judicial deference to independent
administrative agencies on the ground that they lack political accountability. See MARTIN
COLLET, LE CONTROLE JURIDICTIONNEL DES ACTES DES AuToRrrEs ADMnNISTRATIVES
INDEPENDANTES 171-72 (2003). However, members of French regulatory agencies are
usually appointed through politically accountable processes for limited time periods. For
example, the nine members of the French Broadcasting Authority are appointed: one-third
by the President, one-third by the Parliament, and one-third by the Senate. Agency
members are under some pressure to satisfy the politicians who appointed them (or their
voters) in order to assure their appointment to the same or to other functions. Furthermore,
unlike U.S. agencies, French agencies have limited rulemaking power and may be subject to
rules promulgated by a politically responsible minister. Hence, even though independent
administrative agencies are less accountable to the government than the central
administration, they remain more accountable than courts, many of whose members are
career officials. They may also be more accountable to the legislature. Thus, there remains
an argument for judicial deference on grounds of political accountability.
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policy or technical aspects, we argue in favor of reasonableness review as an
appropriate way to balance and enhance the competing aspects of state
legitimacy. In addition to allowing oversight that protects rights, this
standard of review gives some leeway to agencies to accomplish their
disparate missions. As has been shown in the U.S. context, this approach
limits the courts' ability to impose their own policy preferences.7 Moreover,
by deferring to agency policy judgments, the courts enhance the political
responsibility of the agencies for the decisions they make. An agency
cannot excuse itself by arguing that it adopted a given policy because it was
the "only possible" legal solution. It is responsible to political actors for its
own decisions and options. In this sense, limited review based on a
reasonableness test not only allocates policy decisions to the most
competent actors, but it also sheds light on those actors' choices and
enhances their responsibility.
Our approach is comparative. We start with Canada, which, we argue,
has settled on a workable and deferential review for reasonableness in
technically complex areas. However, Canadian courts apply substantive
review mostly in the context of individual adjudications, and only rarely in
rulemakings. This leaves a gap in coverage that is filled in the United
States with review of substantive policy decisions made through general
rules under the provisions of the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Nevertheless, U.S. courts also struggle to determine the line between law
and policy because of their greater review authority compared with
Canada.
Italy and France are similar to Canada in that policy made through rules
is not routinely reviewed in either country, although the substance of rules
occasionally figures in individual decisions. However, unlike Canada, their
legal standards lack a realistic appreciation of the role of non-legal experts
in agency decisionmaking. Courts in Canada are quite deferential; the
Italian and French courts provide more stringent oversight. In Italy, the
current orientation toward strong review arose after a long and complex
hesitation; in France it is the result of a long tradition.
Arguing for deference with respect to technocratic regulatory substance,
however, does not imply deference overall. Judicial review of
administrative policymaking processes can serve democratic values. We
7. Judicial bias is a concern of U.S. administrative law scholars, but even the most
critical recognize that the federal courts' limited review responsibilities reduce the degree of
bias. See generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatoy Poliy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, David
Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminay
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology,
and the D.C Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997).
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argue in Part II that courts are capable of such review, even if they are not
able to judge the substance of complex policy choices. We concentrate on
two important procedural aspects: reason-giving requirements-a mixture
of substance and procedure-and public participation in policymaking. In
both cases there may be tensions between rights-based jurisprudence, on
the one hand, and efforts to uphold democratic legitimacy and technical
competence in the executive, on the other.
To see how tensions can arise, consider three motivations for a reason-
giving requirement. First, judges might use the agency's reasons to help
them decide if rights have been violated. Second, reasons might help the
courts figure out if the administration has followed the legislative will.
Third, public reason-giving might improve direct democratic accountability
to citizens. In the first two cases, the reasons could be provided as late as
the time the case comes before the court. In the third case, the agency
would need to publish its reasoning in an open document along with the
administrative agency decision. The public is the addressee of the reasons;
they are designed to convince the citizens, not just the courts. Reason-
giving can complement public participation. The government both is open
to citizen input and must explain its decisions to the public. The courts
would require openness rather than leaving it to the political judgment of
public officials.
Similar issues arise in the context of public participation in agency
actions. From a rights-based perspective, participation refers to the rights
of the individual or firm subject to a government action-denial of a
benefit, imposition of a cost. The person directly affected has a right to be
heard before a decision is made. However, the democratic legitimacy of
executive action has a different focus. Participation includes hearings and
comment periods open to anyone with an interest in the decision, even if
only as a citizen with policy preferences. Participation in that sense goes
beyond "the parties" and even beyond those "stakeholders" with a material
stake in the outcome. Courts are commonly asked to protect the individual
against state overreaching, but in the context of administrative
policymaking, executive branch accountability to the general public and
the competent use of expertise are also central. We ask whether and how
courts might monitor that aspect of government performance.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures under U.S. administrative
law suggest one way for courts to balance deference to agencies' substantive
policy choices against checks on the openness and transparency of
procedures. Procedural requirements for rulemaking are not as widespread
in our other cases. In Canada, France, and Italy, procedural requirements
are common in individual adjudications. We consider this difference and
ask whether procedural review of executive rulemaking might be adapted
2014]
ADAIIvISTRA 77 VE LA REVIEW
to fit the circumstances of our other cases. In all of our cases, regulators
face similar pressures for more accountable executive policymaking. If one
accepts our skepticism about substantive review, then review of procedures
comes to the fore as a response to these concerns.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE POLICY
8
We begin with Canada, where the judicial approach to agency expertise
has shifted markedly from very intrusive to very deferential. We then
discuss the United States, where courts are more deeply engaged in the
review of rules before they go into effect. We next move to the civil law
cases. Italy has followed a variable route-moving from intensive review to
deference and back again without taking the modern policymaking
environment into account. We end with France, which has special features
that make it a more problematic case, but one that raises a number of
important issues about the role of the courts. We conclude that in
technically complex cases review of substance should be deferential. Courts
can review the "reasonableness" of administrative choices but ought not to
become deeply involved in substantive controversies that they are ill-
prepared to judge.
A. Canada
In Canada, there is very limited judicial review of the substance of
administrative rulemaking. Review is only possible on constitutional
grounds, including breaches of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Judicial review of administrative adjudication has evolved from very
intrusive to quite deferential and nuanced. In recent decades, the Supreme
Court of Canada has demonstrated a subtle understanding of the way
courts can monitor the executive without exceeding their competence or
their position in the democratic structure.
1. Limited Substantive Review of Rulemaking
Substantial review of administrative rulemaking in Canada is possible
but very limited. Courts can strike down regulations on the grounds of
constitutional violations 9 and for breaches to the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. They will also review the substance of rules to assess
8. For a more complete account of the intensity of substantive judicial review in our
four countries, seejordlo, supra note *.
9. See Beauchemin v. Blainville (2003), 231 D.L.R. 4th 706 (Can.); Canadian Civil
Liberties Ass'n v. Ontario (Minister of Education) (1990), 71 OR. 2d 341 (Can.); Rocket v.
Royal Coll. of Dental Surgeons, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, 232 (Can.).
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if they were promulgated within the grant of power to the executive or to
agencies (jurisdictional grounds).10 In all those cases, review is usually based
on the non-deferential standard of correctness.
Administrative rules are not subject to attack on other grounds. Judicial
review is not available on the basis of bad faith I I or unreasonableness, 12 for
example. In Thorne's Hardware Ltd., applicants challenged for "bad faith" an
Order in Council extending the limits of a port in New Brunswick. 13 With
the extension, the port would include the applicants' private berth and
harbor facilities. According to them, the order was passed for the sole
purpose of increasing the National Harbours Board's revenues. The
Supreme Court refused to review the Order:
We were invited to undertake such an examination but I think that with all
due respect, we must decline. It is neither our duty nor our right to
investigate the motives which impelled the federal Cabinet to pass the Order
in Council .... [T]he government's reasons for expanding the harbour are
in the end unknown. Governments do not publish reasons for their
decisions; governments may be moved by any number of political, economic,
social or partisan considerations . . . .The Governor in Council quite
obviously believed that he had reasonable grounds for passing [the order]
extending the boundaries of SaintJohn Harbour and we cannot enquire into
the validity of those beliefs in order to determine the validity of the Order in
Council.14
2. The Evolution ofJudicial Review ofAdministrative Adjudications
Until 1979, Canadian courts reviewed administrative adjudications very
aggressively. This approach led to serious conflicts with the government.
Parliament reacted by adding "privative clauses" to statutes that explicitly
exempted certain government decisions from judicial review. 15 The courts
initially responded by circumventing these clauses through the use of the
"preliminary question doctrine."16 A preliminary or jurisdictional question
10. See Enbridge Gas Distrib. Inc. v. Ontario Energy Bd. (2005) 74 O.R. 3d 147 (Can.).
11. See Thorne's Hardware Ltd. v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 106, 111, 112 (Can.);
see also SARA BLAKE, ADMhNISTRATIVE LAW IN CANADA 148 (4th ed. 2006).
12. UL Canada Inc. v. Procureur G~n~ral du Quebec (2003), 234 D.L.R. 4th 398,
para. 25, 32 (Can.), affid, [2005] S.C.R. 143 (Can.); Aerlinte Eireann Teoranta v. Canada
(Minister of Transport), [1987] 3 F.C. 383, affd, (1990) 68 D.L.R. 4th 220, 220 (Can.).
13. Thorne's Hardware Ltd., 1 S.C.R. 106.
14. Id. at 112-15.
15. Privative clauses are statutory provisions that impose limits on the judicial review of
administrative decisions.
16. The "preliminary question doctrine" was extremely important and dominant
before 1979. In a 1988 decision the Supreme Court stated that: "The principle itself presents
2014]
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is one that concerns the jurisdiction of the administrative agency to decide a
given matter. Accordingly, the judiciary subjected agency decisions to very
exacting review, under the standard of "correctness." Courts interpreted
this doctrine broadly to justify intrusive oversight. 17
Eventually, the Supreme Court of Canada ended the era of intrusive
review in a landmark 1979 decision, Canadian Union of Public Employees, a
case challenging a decision of the Labour Board with respect to a particular
strike, not a general rule. 18 The individual case did, however, articulate a
broader policy. The Court criticized excessive judicial intervention and
created a standard of review called "patent unreasonableness."' 19 Under
this standard, agencies had "the right to be wrong," and the Court annulled
their decisions only when they were "so patently unreasonable that [their]
construction [could not] be rationally supported by the relevant
legislation," 20 or when they were "so flawed that no amount of curial
deference [could] justify letting [them] stand."
21
Judicial deference persists to the present. In many cases courts defer
even in the absence of a privative clause. They seldom apply the
correctness standard to strike down administrative actions, and the few
cases where they do involve general questions of law, human rights,
constitutional issues, or jurisdictional concerns. Of particular interest to
our inquiry is the Court's contextual approach to determining the standard
of review.
no difficulty, but its application is another matter." Union des Employ~s de Service, Local 298
v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, 1086 (Can.).
17. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, [1970] 1 S.C.R.
425, 435-36 (Can.); Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Comm'n, [1971] 1 S.C.R. 756, 772, 775
(Can.). Those decisions followed the House of Lords precedent in Anisminic v. Foreign
Compensation Comm'n, [1969] 2 A.C. 147 (Can.). Many years later, the Canadian Supreme
Court noticed that such a precedent had "set forth a definition of jurisdictional error that
was so broad as to include any question involving the interpretation of a statute." Canada
(Attorney Gen.) v. Pub. Serv. Alliance of Can., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 614, 644 (Can.).
18. Canadian Union of Pub. Emps., Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979]
2 S.C.R. 227 (Can.).
19. Canadian courts have historically applied three standards of review: (i) correctness;
(ii) reasonableness (simpliciter); and (iii) patent unreasonableness. "Correctness" is a very
intrusive standard, currently applied mostly to questions of law. The "reasonableness
simpliciter' standard was situated somewhere between those two extreme positions. The
Supreme Court first applied it in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, 765, 779 (Can.). However, the vagueness of the standard made it very
difficult to apply and to distinguish from "patent unreasonableness" standards. Hence, the
Supreme Court decided to combine them into a single reasonableness standard. See Dunsmuir
v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 195 (Can.).
20. Canadian Union of Pub. Emps., 2 S.C.R. 227, 237 (Can.).
21. Law Soc'y of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 269-70 (Can.).
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3. The Contextualized Standard of Review
Canadian administrative law has developed a workable two-stage
structure. First, the Court determines the standard of review that it will
apply.22 Second, it decides the case using that standard. The analytical
framework used for the first stage was first called the "pragmatic and
functional" approach. 23 Since the Supreme Court decision in Dunsmuir, the
reformed test is called "standard of review analysis." 24 Applied to issues of
both statutory construction and administrative discretion, 25 this analysis is a
four-pronged test that weighs different factors of the decision under review:
(i) the presence of a privative clause or a statutory right of appeal;26 (ii) the
purpose of the administrative agency within its enabling legislation; (iii) the
expertise of the agency relative to the reviewing court on the issue in
question; (iv) the nature of the question-law, fact, or mixed law and fact.
Courts verify how the administrative decision scores on each of the four
factors, and the appropriate standard of review emerges from this scoring
exercise.
This analytical framework is relevant for two reasons. First, the decision
of what standard of review to apply is transparent, enhancing the
accountability of the courts and legitimizing their decisions to intervene or
limit their oversight. Second, under the prongs of the test, courts weigh
substantial and institutional aspects of the agency's decision. The
framework goes against the formalistic approach followed by most civil law
countries (that use formal concepts such as discretionary or
nondiscretionary competence to determine the standard of review), and it
requires the courts to assess which institution is better constituted to decide
the issue under review.
For our purposes, three prongs are particularly relevant. Under the
second prong, courts assess the role of the agency. If the agency acts as a
22. The pragmatic and functional approach was first mentioned in Union des Employs de
Seice, Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, 1081 (Can.), but its classic four prongs were
only established and explained ten years later in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
andImmigration). [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, 1005-12 (Can.).
23. See Dunsmuir, 1 S.C.R. 190, 248 ("Generally speaking courts have the last word
on ... legal matters[,] . . .while administrators should generally have the last word.., to
decide administrative matters.").
24. Id. at 192 (merging patent unreasonableness and reasonableness into a single
reasonableness standard).
25. The "pragmatic and functional approach" was initially applied only to instances of
statutory construction and was only extended to discretionary decisions in Baker v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration). [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 854-55 (Can.).
26. The existence of privative clauses should not be taken to be definitive in
determining a deferential approach, but they are indicative that deference might be due.
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court that adjudicates the rights of the parties, it should be considered an
inferior court, and its decisions should be subject to a thorough review. If
the agency promulgates policies or balances competing public interests, the
courts should grant it more deference. The Canadian Supreme Court
based its deference on an understanding of the policymaking process in
agencies and executive departments, and it developed the concept of
polycentricity. A polycentric issue is one that involves delicate balancing
among different interests. If agencies are competent to resolve polycentric
issues, courts should usually defer to their decisions. The Canadian
Supreme Court first used the concept in Pushpanathan.2 7 It explained that:
[W]hile judicial procedure is premised on a bipolar opposition of parties,
interests, and factual discovery, some problems require the consideration of
numerous interests simultaneously, and the promulgation of solutions which
concurrently balance benefits and costs for many different parties. Where an
administrative structure more closely resembles this model, courts will
exercise restraint.
28
The Court thus recognizes that some issues are not properly dealt with
using the usual institutional arrangement of a court even if the decisions
resolve an individual case, such as an antitrust dispute. If an issue is more
"political" than legal, it should be resolved by institutions that are designed
for making policy.29 The courts act as a backstop and can intervene in
particularly extreme cases, but otherwise the policymakers have the right to
choose. The courts recognize that the judicial model is a poor template for
regulatory policymaking.
Under the third prong, courts must evaluate whether the specific issue
27. Pushpanathan v. Canada (Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1
S.C.R. 982 (Can.).
28. Id. at 1009.
29. See id. (developing the concept of polycentricity, the Court held that a board
decision to deny refugee status to an individual with a criminal conviction was not a
polycentric one but involved the correctness of the board's interpretation of a human rights
convention). For a recent decision where the Court found that the issue was polycentric, see
Bell Canada v. Bell Aliant Regional Communications., [2009] 2 S.C.R. 764, 767 (Can.). See also
Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, 777 (Can.). In Voice
Construction Ltd. v. Construction and General Workers Union, Local 92, the Supreme Court
characterized the arbitrators' decisions as adjudicative, whereas decisions of the labor board
would be polycentric. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 609, 610 (Can.). See also Levis (City) v. Fraternit6 des
Policiers de Levis Inc., [2007] 1 S.C.R. 591, 610 (acknowledging polycentricity in an
arbitrator's decision). For discussions on the polycentric nature of the issue, see, e.g., Barrie
Pub. Utilities v. Canadian Cable Television Ass'n, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 476, 492, 522 (Can.) and ATCO
Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140, 161 (Can.).
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under review falls into the area of agency expertise. If it does, judicial
review is limited. Thus, for example, although courts will not defer in cases
where the precise issue under review is the interpretation of a term of art in
civil law,30 they will defer on issues involving complex and technical
assessments that the agency seems better placed to address, such as antitrust
litigation 3' or financial market regulation.3 2 The Supreme Court referred
to three important dimensions of expertise: (i) the court must characterize
the expertise of the agency in question; (ii) it must consider its own expertise
relative to that of the agency; and (iii) it must identify how the specific issue
before the administrative decisionmaker relates to this expertise. 33 Hence,
expertise is a relative concept: it must be assessed in relation to that of the
tribunal and relative to a given question. The Canadian Supreme Court
also makes clear that expertise does not necessarily require specialized
knowledge. It can stem from the use of special procedures or non-judicial
means of implementing the Act, or from the contextual sensitivity obtained
through making decisions over time.
34
Finally, under the fourth prong, courts must evaluate the nature of the
question at issue.35 Whereas questions of law (such as constitutional and
human rights issues) should be subjected to exacting review, questions of
fact and of policy are given more deference.
36
This pragmatic and functional approach allows the courts to strike a
balance among the three-fold aspects of legitimacy: rights, democratic
responsiveness, and competence. If competence or democratic
responsiveness is critical to the decision under review, courts will usually
30. See Union des Employds de Service, Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048,
1049-50 (Can.) (finding that the term "alienation" was typical of civil law, and thus was a
general question of law, requiring no deference to the agency's interpretation).
31. See Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1
S.C.R. 748, 774-775 (Can.) (holding that because the antitrust agency had a majority of lay
members, that fact suggested the court should defer. See also DavidJ. Mullan, Establishing the
Standard of Review: The Struggle for Complexity, 17 CANJ ADMIN. L. & PRAc. 59, 66 (2004).
32. Pezim v. B.C. (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557, 598-99 (Can.)
(deciding that the interpretation of the legislative expression "material change" required
specific knowledge of the regulation of financial markets; hence it deferred to the agency).
33. Pushpanathan, 1 S.C.R. 982, at 1007.
34. See Canada (Attorney Gen.) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, 598 (Can.) ("Where
the question is one that requires a familiarity with and understanding of the context, there is
a stronger argument that a higher degree of deference may be appropriate.").
35. After Dunsmuir, the relevance of the fourth prong may have increased. In dissent,
Justice Deschamps claimed that "any review starts with the identification of the questions at
issue as questions of law, questions of fact or questions of mixed fact and law." Dunsmuir v.
New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 197 (Can.) (Deschamps,J., dissenting).
36. Dr. Qv. Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons of B.C., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 235, 241
(Can.).
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defer to the agencies' choices because of their higher political accountability
or technical expertise. If, however, the protection of rights is particularly
salient, the courts will intervene.
B. United States
In the United States, the courts frequently review the way agencies
construe statutes. In the famous Chevron case, the United States Supreme
Court accepted an agency's statutory interpretation and seemed to signal a
deferential approach to agency legal interpretations. 37  However,
subsequent case law presents a mixed picture. Even if statutory
interpretation is not in question, courts can still review the substance of
regulations using an "arbitrary and capricious" or a "substantial evidence"
test. Even the former, seemingly less demanding standard, is sometimes
applied quite aggressively. Also, the line between review of an agency's
interpretation of statutory terms and review of its application of a statute to
a policy choice is often quite blurry.
1. The Administrative Procedure Act
In the absence of constitutional provisions, the APA, passed in 1946,
provides a framework for the administrative process and for judicial
review. 38 It has the status of a "landmark statute" that provides important
background conditions and is well-entrenched in American public law.
39
The statute distinguishes rulemaking, licensing, and adjudication, but the
section on judicial review is applicable across the board to "agency
action. '40  The distinction that the Canadian court makes between
deferential review of polycentric policymaking and stronger review of
applications of the law in particular cases is reflected in the APA's
distinction between informal and formal processes. Informal rulemaking is
polycentric. Formal procedures are court-like with on-the-record decisions
and provisions for cross-examination. 41 They are usually used for
adjudications. As Thomas Merrill argues, these provisions largely track the
judge-made law in effect before the passage of the APA.42
37. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 551 etseq (2012).
39. See Bruce Ackerman, Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120 HARV.
L. REv. 1737, 1811 (2006); see also William N. EskridgeJr. &John Ferejohn, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERIcAN CONSTITUTON (2010) (developing a broader category called
super-statutes, which also includes the APA).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
41. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557.
42. Thomas NV. Merrill, The Origins of American-Style Judicial Review, in COMPARATIVE
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The informal rulemaking process requires only notice, an opportunity
for public input, and a statement of reasons accompanying the published
final rule. 43 The federal courts have given agencies leeway to decide how to
proceed-whether by rules or adjudications, and whether by informal or
formal rulemaking. 44  Not surprisingly, agencies seldom use formal
procedures unless they are required by statute. The choice of "informal
rulemaking" should be seen not as a failing but as an appropriate response
to the nature of the agencies' policymaking tasks. True, the courts, over
time, have amplified the requirements of informal rulemaking to facilitate
their own review and to enhance public accountability. However, these
elaborations retain the essentially policy-oriented and polycentric nature of
the process.
45
Substantive review of rules usually occurs under the APA's "arbitrary
and capricious" standard that seems similar to Canada's "reasonableness"
standard. Some statutes impose a "substantial evidence" test, nominally
stronger but hard to distinguish in practice. 46 In this context the federal
courts developed the so-called "hard look" doctrine that can be read in two
ways. Under one view, it requires the agency to take a hard look at the
options with the courts checking to be sure it did so-an essentially
procedural review. Alternatively, it can mean that the court itself takes a
hard look at the agency's decision-in other words, it reviews the
substance. In many cases it seems to be a mixture of both.47 The former is
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 389 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 553. Section 553(c) permits but does not require formal proceedings
under §§ 556 and 557.
44. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (stating
that "the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the
Board's discretion"); see also Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 482 F.
2d 672, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (deferring to agency choice to engage in rulemaking); Nat'l
Labor Relations Bd. v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1969) (permitting the
National Labor Relations Board to act through adjudication instead of rulemaking); United
States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 246 (1973) (refusing to require formal
rulemaking when the agency chose to use informal rulemaking).
45. Active review by the D.C. Circuit on procedural grounds was halted by the
Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978).
46. On the difficulty of making the distinction, see Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman,
Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safey Act, 20 UCLA L. REv. 899, 933-37 (1973)
(pointing out that the APA's substantial evidence test refers to decisions made "on the
record" under the formal rulemaking and adjudication provisions of the APA).
47. The debate over "hard look" review was most famously developed in opinions by
Judges Harold Leventhal and David Bazelon in Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the
Role ofthe Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974). See the discussion infa, at note 154.
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obviously more deferential and rooted in the administrative process than
the latter. Overall, somewhat contradictory messages have come from the
Supreme Court. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the Supreme
Court characterized the arbitrary and capricious test as "searching and
careful." 48 More recently, it reversed a lower court, observing that "the
arbitrary and capricious standard is extremely narrow. . . and allows the
Board wide latitude in fulfilling its obligations .... It is not for the Federal
Circuit to substitute its own judgments for that of the Board. ' 49
2. Statutory Construction and Judicial Review
Frequently, agencies need to interpret their authorizing statutes before
proceeding to regulate. Some of the most difficult problems of judicial
review arise under regulatory statutes that require the application of expert,
technical knowledge, outside the comfort zone of mostjudges. Where does
statutory interpretation end and policymaking under the law begin?
Courts often state that they are particularly qualified to judge "pure"
questions of statutory interpretation. 50 These seem like archetypal issues for
judicial resolution. Yet, if the meaning of a statutory term depends upon
expert non-legal knowledge, courts will be poorly equipped to judge
whether agency actions are compatible with their statutory mandate. Law
and policymaking under the law do not sit in self-contained boxes. This
tension in the context of the U.S. Clean Air Act led to the Chevron decision,
reviewing a rule promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) that changed the interpretation of a legal provision used by the
previous administration. The Court deferred to the EPA's interpretation of
the statutory term because Congress had not defined it carefully (step one)
and because the agency's interpretation was reasonable (step two). The
Court deferred on both political and technical grounds. An incoming
administration has leeway to rethink the meaning of a statutory term
consistent with its own policy priorities. Deference reduces the focus on law
and increases the focus on policies that follow from the law, and it sheds
light and attention on the agencies' choices, augmenting their political
responsibility.5 1
48. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc., v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
49. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2001).
50. In Chevron itself, the Supreme Court stated in a famous footnote: "The judiciary is
the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
51. See E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of
Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. LJ. 1, 16 (2005) (arguing
that the Chevron doctrine of deference has transferred power in the agencies from lawyers to
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The actual impact of the Chevron doctrine is much debated. It is among
the most heavily cited cases of all time,52 and some empirical studies show
that the percentage of administrative decisions that Courts affirmed rose
after Chevron.53 Others, however, have found that the Supreme Court
continues to impose its own interpretations of the law on agencies, often
without even citing Chevron.54 Subsequent cases have narrowed the reach of
Chevron, giving greater deference to policies enacted through processes such
as notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudications under the terms of the
APA. 55 It defers on substance, not process, but a democratically legitimate
or a more formal process can convince the Court to defer.
These developments illustrate the interaction between legal substance
and the administrative process. To the extent that the agency follows
informal rulemaking procedures that suit the issue at hand and are not
heavily judicialized, the courts will give great weight to agency legal
interpretations. Court-like procedures are not necessary for the courts to
defer to agency readings of the law, especially because such court-like
formalities are not appropriate for the production of general rules that do
not decide individual cases.
The deeply intertwined nature of law and policy is at the heart of the
Chevron decision. One can read it as an effort to respect the policymaking
authority of government agencies by giving them leeway to interpret their
legal mandate. This focus on policymaking through statutory
interpretation is clear in Chevron itself, but also in many other decisions. For
instance, in Pauly v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc.,56 the Supreme Court stated:
As Chevron itself illustrates[,] the resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is
often more a question of policy than of law .... When Congress, through
express delegation or the introduction of an interpretive gap in the statutory
policymakers).
52. As of February 2011, Chevron had been cited 10,720 times by the federal courts.
The number gready exceeds the mentions of other important public law cases. STEPHEN G.
BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASs R. SUNSTEIN, ADRIAN VERMEULE, & MICHAEL E.
HERZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND REGULATORY POLICY 287 (7th ed. 2011).
53. See, e.g., Peter H. Shuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE LJ. 984, 1026 (1991); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding
Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study on the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Court ofAppeals, 15 YALE
J. ON REG. 1, 1-4 (1998).
54. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference. Supreme Court
Treatment ofAgency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. LJ. 1083 (2008).
55. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (holding that a U.S.
Customs Services (now Customs and Border Protection) tariff classification was not entitled
to deference under Chevron, given its informality and its lack ofprecedential value).
56. 501 U.S. 680,696 (1991).
2014]
ADMLmiSTRA T1VE LA W RE VIEW
structure, has delegated policymaking authority to an administrative agency,
the extent ofjudicial review of the agency's policy determinations is limited.
57
Moreover, Chevron deference only applies to agencies that hold delegated
policymaking authority, further evidence of the link between policymaking
and judicial deference.
58
However, although the courts may defer to agency interpretations of the
law, the timing of review gives the courts a greater impact on government
policymaking than in Canada. Review of a rule can occur before the rule
goes into effect under Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, giving the courts the
opportunity to influence an agency's actions before it has taken steps to lock
in its regulatory policies.
59
3. The Practice of Chevron
Although the Chevron doctrine is based on a theory of deference, its
practical application has sometimes departed from this orientation. Under
step one, the Court is supposed to assess whether "Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue."' 60 In practice, courts use the so-
called "traditional tools of statutory construction" to decide this issue, and
sometimes they reach out to find and resolve ambiguity against agency
interpretations. Courts frequently conclude that a given text is not
ambiguous, but only after a rather long analysis of the purpose of the
statute or its legislative history. In addition, dissenting opinions undermine
the majority's claim that the language is indeed clear.
Step one seems like a more "legal" step; whereas step two considers how
the agency translated law into policy. It is certainly easier for courts to
legitimize their action when they annul an administrative decision for "legal
reasons," and not for the unreasonableness of the policy, and as a result, it
is rare for a court to set aside an agency action in step two. At times, courts
seem to use the traditional tools of construction in step one to regain the
powers of statutory construction that they lost with Chevron. An example is
FDA v. Brown & Williamson.61 The case involved the Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA's) limited effort to regulate the sale of cigarettes.
The five-judge majority overturned these regulations as exceeding the
agency's statutory mandate. The opinion acknowledged the adverse health
57. 501 U.S. at 696.
58. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 152-
53(1991).
59. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 155-56 (1967).
60. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
61. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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effects of tobacco, but held that Congress had not given the agency
authority to regulate tobacco products. The four dissenters would have left
space for the agency, with its expertise and policy mandate, to reinterpret
statutory terms in light of changing scientific evidence, its own best
judgment, and a new administration's policy priorities.
62
Decisions such as Brown & Williamson limit the public accountability
benefits of the Chevron doctrine, by enhancing the presumption in favor of
the Court's interpretation of statutory terms. The problem, as Richard
Pierce puts it is that:
If reviewing courts are free to use any combination of the "traditional tools of
statutory construction" they choose in the process of applying Chevron step
one, few if any cases will reach Chevron step two. It is the very indeterminacy
of the 'traditional tools' that gives judges the discretion to make policy
decisions through the process of statutory construction. The purpose of the
Chevron test is to place policymaking in the hands of the politically
accountable agencies to which Congress has delegated that power, rather
than in the hands of politically unaccountable judges. The Court should
restate step one of Chevron in simple, commonsense terms.
63
C. Comparison between the American and Canadian Cases
In Canada, a finding of statutory ambiguity that leads to judicial
deference is quite straightforward and arises from the courts' analysis of the
text. The courts use the "traditional tools of construction," only after the
ambiguity has been located, to assess the reasonableness or correctness of
administrative statutory construction. 64 Still, if a term requires long analysis
to ascertain its "correct" meaning, Canadian courts will usually defer to the
agency's interpretation so long as it is "reasonable." 65 In short, in the face
of complexity and ambiguity, the Canadian courts generally accept agency
interpretations of statutory texts.
In principle, there does not seem to be any fundamental bar to the U.S.
Supreme Court moving in the Canadian direction toward greater
62. Id. at 161-63.
63. RICHARD PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 237 (5th ed., vol. 1, Aspen
Publishers, 2010).
64. See Union des Employhs de Service, Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048,
1050 (Can.).
65. See Nat'l Corn Growers Ass'n v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324,
1326; Canadian Union of Pub. Emps., Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] 2
S.C.R. 227, 230, 242 (Can.) (analyzing four possible meanings of a statutory term and
concluding that all were equally reasonable); see also Canada (Director of Investigation &
Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, 787 (Can.) (holding that although an
agency finding could be "difficult to accept" it was not "unreasonable").
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deference to agencies. The text of the APA would not prevent such a
development. The Court would only need to soften Chevron step one to
permit agencies to implement a more open-ended range of statutory
interpretations. Many of the canons in use today by courts in the United
States, as William Eskridge points out, have little logical or conceptual
grounding.66 Some are based on grammatical rules about how to read a
text, but many are open to contestation as indicated in conflicting Court of
Appeals decisions and in Supreme Court cases that generate dissents or that
overturn lower court interpretations. 67 Others are tied to an understanding
of the proper role of the courts, and their reluctance explicitly to resolve
partisan disputes or reach out to find a statute unconstitutional.
Both Canadian and American judges recognize that policymaking may
require polycentric, informal efforts to gather information and balance a
range of options. This implies both judicial deference to agency choices
and acceptance of procedures very different from those used in court.
Canadian law distinguishes between questions of law where "correctness" is
the proper standard and others where for a variety of reasons, including
expertise, deference is appropriate. The U.S. courts, which provide much
more review of rulemaking, leave considerable space for agency
policymaking under delegated authority. Nevertheless, the courts continue
to struggle with both the meaning of Chevron and with its relationship to the
arbitrary and capricious standard.
One reason for the continuing differences between Canadian and U.S.
case law is the contrasting objects of review. The U.S. courts frequently
review agencies' interpretations of statutes when they promulgate rules and
regulation but before the agencies apply these rules in individual cases.
These decisions, of which Chevron is an example, raise issues of statutory
interpretation in a particularly clear form that force the U.S. courts to
evaluate the way agencies make general policy under the law. Such cases
are quite uncommon in Canada because there is no formal provision for
review of rules before they go into effect. Of course, the U.S. courts could
follow the Canadian model and could defer to most agency interpretations.
That would simplify U.S. courts' review of rules and permit agencies to
66. The origin of the term "canons" in the dogma of the Roman Catholic Church is
consistent with the use of the term to signal a principle that should be accepted on faith. See
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1994).
67. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
The decision turned on how a list of conditions should be read. The majority assumed that
each term must add something to coverage of the act. Id. at 701-03. The dissent argued
that all the items referred to the same kind of thing. Id. at 718-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For an example of judicial disagreements, see OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583
(6th Cir. 2005) (discussing the meaning of the word "and" in a statute).
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develop their own interpretations of legal terms in accord with their
statutory mandates and the political environment. As we argue below, a
deeper concern for process could replace substantive review of agencies'
interpretation of legal terms as applied in technical areas. In short, the
Canadian approach to substantive review responds better to the relative
competence of courts than the U.S. approach. However, adoption of that
approach would be more difficult in the U.S. because courts more often
review general norms or rules in ways that invite them to examine agencies'
interpretations of the underlying statutory text.
D. Italy
We turn now to two countries in the civil law tradition: Italy and France.
Although the civil law-common law contrast is sharpest in private law, the
interactions between courts and agencies also differ from the Canadian and
U.S. cases. Furthermore, the contrast between Canada and the U.S.
carries over to the European cases. Like Canada, France and Italy do not
have a generic requirement for notice-and-comment rulemaking that is
subject to judicial review for compliance with the underlying statutory law.
Italy has a separate system of administrative courts that culminates in the
Consiglio di Stato. 68 This body is responsible for most of the case law
dealing with judicial review of executive policymaking.69  Substantive
review of administrative rulemaking is very rare. We thus focus on the
review of administrative adjudication. Recent developments in the case law
illustrate the tensions that arise when the courts defer to policymaking that
arises out of a series of adjudications. Italian public law began with a
period of strict review followed by a shift to deference for decisions that
applied expertise to policy. Finally, the courts settled back into a phase of
non-deferential review.
68. For an overview in English, see generally Franco Gaetano Scoca, Essay,
Administrative Justice in Italy, Origins & Evolution, 2 ITALIANJ. OF PUB. L. 118 (2009), available at
http:/ /www.ijpl.eu/archive/2009/issues-2/administrative-justice-in-italy-origins-and-
evolution.
69. The Italian administrative jurisdiction (giurisdizione amministrativa) is headed by the
Consiglio di Stato, and the TribunaliAmministrativi Regionali (TAR) are the courts of first instance.
The Consiglio di Stato acts both as an administrative court and an adviser to the
government, like its French counterpart. Both the Consiglio di Stato and the TARs are
staffed by administrative judges, not by civil judges. One-fourth of the members of the
Consiglio di Stato are nominated by the government; another fourth are chosen by public
competition; half of the members come from the different TARs. Consiglio di Stato rulings
can only be challenged for jurisdictional violations, Art. 103, 111 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
The Consiglio has jurisdictional powers over the decisions of the TARs. The whole case
before the TAR goes to the Consiglio di Stato on appeal-not only questions of law. Legge
10 ottobre 1990, n. 287 (It.).
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1. Rare Instances of Substantive Review ofAdministrative Rulemaking
Administrative rulemaking in Italy is virtually exempt from substantive
judicial review-a situation that has led some authors to refer to this
domain as a "land of nobody" (terra di nessuno).7o First, review for
unconstitutionality is not available. The competence of the Constitutional
Court applies only to "statutes and acts having the force of law. 71 The
Constitutional Court can check the constitutionality of a statute that
unlawfully confers rulemaking competence, but it cannot check the
constitutionality of the administrative rule itself.
Second, administrative courts usually refrain from reviewing the legality
of rules on the grounds that their "generality" means that they cannot
violate legal rights or interests. Only on the rare occasions, where a direct
violation is deemed possible, is substantial review available. As the regional
administrative court of Lazio puts it, "a direct challenge to an
administrative rule is exceptional. ' 72 Normally, judicial review is only
available for measures that implement an administrative rule. 73
In addition, administrative courts have for decades refused to "disapply"
(disapplicare) an administrative rule that was contrary to legislation. Such
rules had legal force so that the courts could annul specific adjudications
that violate them. From 1992, the courts' doctrine changed, and judges
now may "disapply" or set aside an unlawful rule in a specific matter
(without annulling the rule).
74
2. The Development of the Case Law on Administrative Adjudications
Traditionally, Italian courts work within a binary framework, giving
limited review to discretionary decisions and stronger review to non-
discretionary decisions. 75  Administrative discretion (discrezionalitd
70. Fabio Cintioli, L'effettivitd della tutela giurisdizionale nell'annullamento dei regolamenti, 2
FORO AMMINISTRATIVO T.A.R. 2779 (2003).
71. Art. 134 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.); see also Corte Cost. (Constitutional Court),18
ottobre 2000, n. 427, Giur. it. 2000 (It.).
72. See TAR Lazio, sez. ii, 25 febbraio 2008, n. 1685.
73. See, e.g., Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 29 febbraio 1996, n. 222.
74. See Cons. Stato, sez. v, 26 febbraio 1992, n. 154. Subsequent case law confirmed
and expanded the instances where the "disapplication" is possible. See Cons. Stato, 24 luglio
1993, n. 799; Cons. Stato, sez. v, 19 settembre 1995, n. 1332; Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 29
febbraio 1996, n. 222; Cons. Stato, sez. v, 10 gennaio 2003, n. 35; Cons. Stato, sez. v, 4
febbraio 2004, n. 367; TAR Lazio, Roma, sez. ii, 14 ottobre 2004, n. 11000; Cons. Stato,
sez. vi, 24 gennaio 2005, n. 123; Cons. Stato, sez. v, 25 gennaio 2005, n. 155; Cons. Stato,
sez. vi, 29 aprile 2005, n. 2034.
75. Usually, to annul a decision on abuse of power (eccesso dipotere) grounds, the decision
must be shown to be unreasonable, illogical, incoherent, or improperly justified. See Michele
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amministrativa) has a very specific meaning: it corresponds to the balance of
competing public interests. Only in cases requiring balancing do courts
engage in limited review; traditionally, judges do not defer to agencies'
construction of ambiguous statutory terms.
Eventually, going against this tradition, courts developed the concept of
"technical discretion" (discrezionalitd tecnica) for instances where the
administrative authorities interpret ambiguous or debatable technical
legislative terms.76 For example, the Consiglio di Stato deferred to the
administration's determination of whether a building was of "particular
historical or artistic interest" (di particolare interesse storico-artistio),77 and in
another case it deferred on whether an advertisement could be considered
"dangerous" (la pericolosit di una immagine pubblicitaria).78 The courts' limited
review of these administrative actions79 was harshly criticized by legal
scholars on the ground that the so-called "technical discretion" was not
really "discretion" because it did not involve the balance of competing
public interests.8 0  Accordingly, the critics argued that "technical
discretion" should be subject to stringent review.
In 1999, after a landmark decision, technical discretion became
reviewable on non-deferential terms.81 The case concerned a judge with a
range of pre-existing health conditions, who claimed a connection between
his heart attack and his working conditions. The Consiglio di Stato
overturned the findings of two expert commissions and awarded state
benefits to the plaintiff. This case represented a clear and acknowledged
departure from previous case law. In subsequent cases, however, the
Consiglio di Stato provided only limited review of expert choices,
particularly antitrust agency decisions.82
The Consiglio di Stato sought to explain the confusing state of affairs in
Corradino, DIRr=O AMMINISTRATIVO 192 (2d ed. 2009).
76. This "debatable nature" (opinabilitd) distinguishes technical discretion from other
kinds of technical decisions that were never subject to limited review (e.g., accertamenti tecnici).
77. Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 12 dicembre 1992, n. 1055.
78. Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 30 novembre 1992, n. 986.
79. See, e.g, Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 5 novembre 1993, n. 801; Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 12
marzo 1996, n. 305; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 23 marzo 1998, n. 358; Cons. Stato, sez. v, 22
giugno 1998, n. 463.
80. See Paolo Lazzara, 'Discrezionalitd tecnica' e situazioni giuridiche soggettive, 2000 DIRITTO
PROCESsUALE AMMINISTRATIVO 182, 212-15 (relating to Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 9 aprile
1999, n. 601).
81. Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 9 aprile 1999, n. 601.
82. See, e.g., Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 14 marzo 2000, n. 1348; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 12
febbraio 2001, n. 652; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 20 marzo 2001, n. 1671; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 26




two cases in 2001 and 2002.83 First, the cases confirmed the changes
brought about by the 1999 decision: actions involving mere "technical
discretion" could be reviewed. However, where technical decisions were
intertwined with real administrative discretion, such as the balance of
multiple public interests, the courts would use "weak review. '84 Instances
where "technical discretion" and administrative discretion were mixed
together and inseparable were called "complex technical assessments"
(valutazione tecniche complesse). Examples are the evaluations performed by the
antitrust agency when it interpreted and applied indeterminate legal
concepts, such as "relevant market" and "abuse of dominant position." 85
The court applied this deferential orientation toward "complex technical
assessments" consistently in later cases, 86 until a new change of direction in
2004. Arguing that its reference to "weak review" had been misinterpreted,
the Consiglio di Stato abandoned the concept and began to stress that
review had only one limit: the judge could not substitute the decision of the
authorities with its own, and the court must annul the administrative
decision and remand the case back to the agency.
The first case decided under the new approach concerned agreements
among competitors to provide lunch vouchers to the public
administration. 87 However, that decision sought to incorporate the new
approach into the older doctrines. Later cases completely abandoned the
previous language, rejecting "weak review" and characterizing their
standard as "full and particularly penetrating" (pieno e particolarmente
penetrante) and "certainly not weak" (certamente non debole).88 Whereas the
Consiglio di Stato previously invoked indeterminate legal concepts to justify
limited review, it now uses "full review also in regard to indeterminate legal
concepts." 89  Whereas the Consiglio di Stato previously highlighted the
agencies' institutional positions to suggest the need for judicial deference, it
83. See Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 06 ottobre 2001, n. 5287 (Formambiente), item 9; Cons. Stato,
sez. vi, 23 aprile 2002, n. 2199 (RCAuto).
84. See Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 23 aprile 2002, n. 2199, item 1.3.1 (providing "weak
review" (sindacato debole) limited to the assessment of the reasonableness and technical
coherence of the administrative decision).
85. The idea of complex technical assessments was linked to the so-called
indeterminate legal concepts (concetti giuridici indeterminat). See Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 23 aprile
2002, n. 2199, item 1.3.1.
86. See, e.g., Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 23 aprile 2002, n. 2199; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 19 luglio
2002, n. 4001; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 1 ottobre 2002, n. 5156; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 16 ottobre
2002, n. 5640.
87. Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 02 marzo 2004, n. 926.
88. See, e.g., Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 3 febbraio 2005, n. 280; Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 8 febbraio
2007, n. 515; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 17 dicembre 2007, n. 6469.
89. Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 3 febbraio 2005, n. 280, item 2.1 (emphasis added).
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now states that a full review is needed because independent agencies are
insulated from the political arena (fuori del circuito dell'indirizzo politico).90 It
remains to be seen exactly how this approach will develop over time.
3. The Current State of Italian Case Law
The concept of "administrative discretion" (discrezionalitd amministrativa) in
Italian law is equivalent to polycentricity in Canadian law-the balance by
the administration of multiple and competing public interests. 9 1 In Italian
law, however, courts traditionally do not acknowledge the existence of
policymaking or the balancing of competing public interests in cases of
statutory construction.
Nevertheless, during two different periods, judges challenged this
traditional orientation. Before 1999, using the notion of "technical
discretion," courts applied limited review to cases where the terms
interpreted were "technical" and "debatable." Between 2002 and 2004,
courts deferred to "complex technical assessments," claiming that category
involved both the interpretation of debatable technical terms and the
balance of competing public interests. This two-year period brought Italian
law closer to American and Canadian practice. For a short period, Italian
courts explicitly admitted that the construction of ambiguous legislative
terms can give rise to policymaking, and hence, to limited review.
The courts did not properly justify the abandonment of this deferential
position after 2004. The Consiglio di Stato introduced its new approach by
claiming that it was just an explanation of its previous case law-in fact, it
represented a complete change of direction. The Consiglio di Stato
presented no justification for its new stringent review. The judges provided
no theoretical explanation to explain why it was now possible to review
aspects of the decision that were beforehand deemed to include a "balance
of public interests." In 2002 the Consiglio di Stato very explicitly affirmed
that cases of "complex technical discretion" involved a combination of
technical and administrative discretion, and hence only limited review was
possible. 92 When it decided to change its orientation and to provide
"complete and effective review," it did not reconsider the degree of pure
discretion embedded in regulatory decisions-it just ignored the issue.
The hesitations and inconsistencies that still persist in Italian law
illustrate the difficulties of applying stringent review to the complex
90. Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 2 marzo 2004, n. 926, item 3.3.
91. In the United States, the Supreme Court has highlighted that administrative
institutions are better designed than courts to "reconcile competing political interests." E.g.,
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984).
92. See, e.g., supra note 83.
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decisions of specialized administrative bodies.93 Although Italian judges
had to craft new criteria to explain their approach, such as complex
technical assessments, intrinsic and extrinsic review, and weak and strong
review, they acknowledged for a period between 2002 and 2004 that the
day-to-day work of regulatory and antitrust agencies involved policymaking
and that courts should not step in.
The judicial movement towards more stringent review was aimed at
"more effective" protection for the rights of citizens, 94 and was
accompanied by several "judge-empowering" legislative reforms. 95
However, the more stringent review left little space for judicial deference to
the administration's policymaking choices. These changes brought Italian
case law closer to French case law (discussed further below), even though
Italian rules on standing96 and on the costs97 ofjudicial review remain less
93. Although the new stringent approach is now clearly dominant, there are cases in
which the Consiglio di Stato still uses the discourse of the deferential era. See, e.g., Cons.
Stato, sez. vi, 8 febbraio 2008, n. 421; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 8 febbraio 2008, n. 424; Cons.
Stato, sez. vi, 20 febbraio 2008, n. 594. Panels with different composition heard the appeals,
and different judges drafted the decisions. Though every judgment upheld the decision of
the Antitrust Authority, the reasoning in each was distinct. One advocated for a deferential
review. Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 8 febbraio 2008, n. 421. Others advocated for very stringent
review, making reference to the current case law of the Council of State. Cons. Stato, sez.
vi, 8 febbraio 2008, n. 424; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 20 febbraio 2008, n. 594. See generally R.
Caranta & B. Marchetti, Judicial Review of Regulatogy Decisions in Italy: Changing the Fonnula and
Keeping the Substance?, in NATIONAL COURTS AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN
COMPETITION LANV AND ECONOMIc REGULATION 145 (Oda Essens et al., eds., 2009).
94. The Consiglio di Stato was criticized during the deferential period on the ground
that its review was ineffective in protecting the rights of citizens. In the post-2004 cases, the
Consiglio di Stato often underlines the "strong, complete, and effective" nature of the review
it now applies. See, e.g., Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 20 febbraio 2008, n. 594.
95. Until the end of the 1990s, administrative courts in Italy could not hire their own
experts to review factual and technical matters. They could use only the instrument of
verjficazione, Regio Decreto 17 agosto 1907, n. 641, which was limited to precise questions
and raised concerns of partiality. This situation changed, first, for cases related to public
servants, Decreto Legge 31 marzo 1998, n. 80, and was then extended to all administrative
matters. Legge 21 luglio 2000, n. 205 (It.). This change paved the way for more stringent
review. The same law also introduced an "abbreviated procedure" (rito abbreviato) that only
affects review of independent administrative agencies. See the Art. 119 of the Code of
Administrative Procedure. Finally, many recent laws, passed to reform the administrative
jurisdiction, increased the powers of the administrative judges, making more stringent review
possible. The Code of Administrative Judicial Procedure (2010) consolidated and extended
this trend. This code should not be confused with the Legge 7 agosto 1990, n. 241, which is
the equivalent of American Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Code of
Administrative Judicial Procedure of 2010 regulates the procedure used by the
administrative courts, whereas the L. n. 241/1990 regulates the procedures used by the
administrative agencies.
96. In comparison to their French counterparts, see discussion infa Part II-E, Italian
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generous than the French procedures. The reforms that empowered judges
to review administrative actions for violations of rights can also lead judges
to interfere with the administration's democratic legitimacy and technical
competence. This tradeoff needs to be acknowledged in the debate over
the role of the judiciary vis-A-vis the administration. Aggressive review for
rights may have negative effects on the executive's ability to respond to
technical considerations and democratic pressures. It may also result in the
imposition of the subjective views of the courts over the comparatively
more technically informed and democratically accountable views of the
executive. Yet, as we discuss below, the courts can maintain a viable role if
they concentrate on procedural, rather than substantive, issues.
Thus, in Italy, public law is left with a sharp dichotomy. If the
administration regulates by issuing general rules, it can avoid judicial
oversight. Judicial deference is not an issue because the courts simply lack
jurisdiction. Alternatively, if an administrative body uses case-by-case
adjudication to carry out its mandate, it will be subject to aggressive review
based on claimed violations of rights; official expertise is not an acceptable
reason to defer on substance if rights are at stake.
E. France
France has had a consistent pattern of non-deferential review of
substance over its recent legal history. Most cases, however, deal with
adjudications. Although the administrative courts have the authority to
review ordinances and directives, their review has not interfered greatly
with the government's interpretation of its statutory or constitutional
mandates.
1. judicial Review
France has a three-tiered system of administrative courts culminating in
courts have less generous rules of standing. The ricorso giurisdizionale "is not a remedy given
in the interest ofjustice," but on behalf of each person whose interests have been violated by
the administration. Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 19 giugno 2006, n. 3638. According to the Italian
case law, these interests must be (i) concrete; (ii) current; and (iii) direct, Cons. Stato, sez. vi,
22 giugno 2004, n. 4412, but courts have evolved from a very strict comprehension of a
"direct interest" to a more generous one.
97. In contrast to French procedure, in Italy, parties must be assisted by a lawyer to go
before the courts. According to Article 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which applies to
the administrative courts as well, the judge will require the losing party to reimburse the
costs of the prevailing party. Codice di procedura civile (1940). Persons who cannot afford
these costs can apply for "legal aid" (gratuito patrocinio). This aid was originally available only
in criminal, military, and civil proceedings, but in 2002 it was extended to administrative
cases.
2014]
ADMINISTRA 77 VE LA W REVIEW
the Conseil d'Etat. With Conseil d'ltat approval, issues of constitutional
rights can be referred to the Conseil Constitutionnel.98 The Conseil d'Etat
remains the main forum for the review of agency action, with two
important exceptions. First, in a series of recent cases, the Conseil
Constitutionnel has interpreted the Environmental Charter in the French
Constitution to require the public's participation in policymaking. Second,
the Cour de Cassation, the highest civil court, reviews agency adjudications
in fields such as antitrust and financial regulations.
The French courts generally provide very intensive judicial review in
areas where they accept jurisdiction. Both structural and substantive
factors contribute to this "judicialization of the administration." Access to
the administrative courts is quite easy. Rules governing standing,99 third-
party interventions,100 and jurisdiction are generous. The liberal standing
rules remain unscathed even after many reforms aimed to mitigate the
overload of administrative cases. Furthermore, cost-shifting rules and other
cost reductions are widespread, 10 1 and in some cases plaintiffs do not need
98. The change arose from the 2008 constitutional revision that introduced the question
prioritaire de constitutionnaliti (QPC), which began to operate in March 2010.
99. Those who have an "interest in the annulment of the administrative decision" have
standing. In practice, administrative courts are very generous in interpreting this standard.
The person filing the challenge does not have to demonstrate a "specific" or "exclusive"
interest. Thus, a user of a public service was able to challenge decisions related to its
organization. Conseil d'Etat (CE) Dec. 21, 1906, Rec. Lebon 962, Syndicat des
propritaires et contribuables du quartier Croix-de-Seguey - Tivoli. Likewise, a taxpayer
could challenge a town's expenses. Conseil d'lttat (CE), Mar. 29, 1901, Requte n. 94580.
Someone who might want to camp in the future could challenge a town's regulation on
camping. Conseil d'Etat (CE) Sect., Feb. 14, 1958, Abisset. Those decisions demonstrate
an intention to encourage such challenges.
100. Groups that would not have standing are almost always able to intervene as third
parties. If the Conseil d'ltat reviews regulatory agencies' decisions, third party interventions
are also generally accepted. See, e.g., CE Sect., Apr. 27, 2009, Requte n. 312741; CE Sect.,
July 24, 2009, Requte n. 324642. The latter concerned the regulation of interconnection
fees. The company Free was allowed to intervene, even though it was not yet an operator.
See Rozen Noguellou, Le Conseil d'Ittat et La Rigulation des Til6communications, 2010 REVUE Du
DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ETA L'ITRANGER 825, 830 (2010).
101. In general, the proceedirgs before administrative courts are less expensive than
proceedings before civil courts. A law passed on December 30, 1977, exempted applicants
from most of the costs in both jurisdictions. Before the administrative courts, besides a
minimal droit de timbre reestablished by a law ofJuly 29, 2011, the only costs that parties face
are lawyers' fees and fees for expertise and inquiries required by the courts. Those costs are
usually borne by the party that loses the case, unless the particular circumstances of the case
recommend otherwise. In addition, judicial aid for poor citizens can reduce or eliminate
even those few costs. See CODE ADMINISTRATIF [C. ADM.] art. R441-1 (Fr.); Conseil d'Etat,
(CE) July 22, 1992, Marcuccini n. 115425. According to article L761-1 of the Code of
Administrative Justice, the judge can condemn the losing party to pay any other costs that
the winning party has faced (frais irrepitibles), but the judge should take into consideration the
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lawyers.102 Individuals can challenge most administrative decisions in court
without having to mount an administrative challenge first. 10 3 In 2000,
reforms allowed the administrative courts to issue injunctions that
suspended the effects of administrative decisions in a wide range of cases. 
104
Although since 1956 the courts can levy fines on those who abuse the right
to challenge administrative actions, fines are very rare and are almost never
imposed at the maximum value of C3,000.105
The administrative courts seek to check excesses of power by public
officials, 10 6 and over time the Conseil d'Etat has widened the grounds for
action for abuse of power (recours pour excs depouvoir). Courts also review the
strength of factual claims (contr6le de 1'exactitude matriel desfais). The public
interest goal behind such review explains the courts' openness to citizen
complaints.107 The courts seek not only to right individual wrongs, but also
economic situation of the parties. CODE ADMINISTRATIF [C. ADM.] art. L761-1 (Fr.).
102. As a general rule, parties must hire a lawyer when they challenge administrative
actions. CODE ADMINISTRATIF [C. ADM.] art. R431-2. However, there are some exceptions.
CODE ADMINISTRATIF [C. ADM.] art. R431-3. A lawyer is not necessary for a recourspour excs
de pouvoir, or REP. The goal is to facilitate these challenges and to preserve the legality of
administrative action. Some challenges involving pensions or elections are also exempt from
the lawyer requirement. That said, a 2003 reform established a general requirement for
lawyers in appeals with the aim of reducing the caseload of the Administrative Court of
Appeals. See Loi 2003-543 du 24 juin 2003 relatif aux cours administratives d'appel et
modifiant la partie R~glementaire du code de justice administrative [Decree 2003-543 of
June 24, 2003 concerning administrative courts of appeal and amending the regulatory part
of the code of administrative justice], J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE J.O.]
[OFFIcIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],June 25, 2003, p. 10657.
103. There is no general obligation to administratively challenge a decision before taking
it to the administrative courts. Many authors, however, suggest that parties be required to
file prior administrative remedies (recours administratifsprialable) before taking the matter to the
courts.
104. A law ofJune 30, 2000, created the rfri-suspension and the rifjri-liberti and reformed
the system of mesures d'urgence, CODE ADMINISTRATIF [C. ADM.] art. L52 1-1. The rdferg-
suspension is similar to a traditional injunction sought in U.S. courts, and it must be requested
by a lawyer. A rife~r-liberig performs a similar function, but it is reserved for imminent
infringement of one's civil liberties and can be requested without a lawyer.
105. See CODEADMINISTRATIF [C. ADM.] art. R741-12.
106. The right to judicially challenge an administrative action is considered a
fundamental liberty, Conseil d'Etat (CE) Mar. 13, 2006, Requ~te n. 291118, Bayrou et
Assoc. de Defense des Usagers des Autoroutes publiques de France, and a constitutional
right by both the Conseil Constitutionnel, see Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional
Court] decision No. 96-373DC, Apr. 9, 1996, J.O. 5724, and the Conseil d'Etat, July 29,
1998, Rec. Lebon 188715, Syndicat des avocats de France. This right is also established in
the European Convention of Human Rights. See Eur. Consult., Fur. Convention on Human
Rights, Art. 13, 15 (June 1, 2010); see also Kudla c. Pologne, 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 35 (2000);
Ihlanc c. Turquie, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (2000).
107. Administrative actions face two kinds of challenges (recours): those based on a claim
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to assure a well-functioning public sector.
Judicial review has become progressively less deferential (under the
standard of contr6le normal), and some authors talk about the decline, or the
death, of the deferential standard of review (contr6le restreint).10 8
Furthermore, occasionally the courts apply stringent review where they
balance the advantages and disadvantages of a given decision in order to
assess its legality, the so-called contr6le du bilan'0 9 that some authors call
"maximum review."''1 0 In some cases, such as the review of administrative
sanctions, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) imposes a non-
deferential standard, but the Conseil d'Etat has recently extended this
approach even in the absence of legislation."ll Thus, France's background
norm of stringent review appears to be developing toward even more
aggressive oversight.
2. Review in the Modern Regulatory State
The system, however, is not well-adapted to the review of the actions of
of "objective" illegality (recours objectis) and those based on a claim of violation of individual
or collective right (recours subjectifs). The recours objectifs promote the general interest in
legality, and they are subject to very lenient rules of admission. The most important recours
objectif is the action for abuse of power (recourspour exces depouvoir).
108. See, e.g., DIDIER TRUCHET, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 216-17 (3d ed. 2010).
109. See Conseil d'Etat (CE), May 28, 1971, Requte n. 78825.
110. See CE Sect., Feb. 15, 1961, Rec. Lebon 121; Conseil d'Etat (CE) Feb. 3, 1975,
Requte n. 94108; Conseil d'Etat (CE), Nov. 2, 1973, Requte n. 82590; Conseil d'Etat
(CE), Feb. 6, 2004, Requte n. 255111; CE Sect., Mar. 10, 2006, Requfte n. 264098.
There is a controversy in French legal literature regarding the number of standards of
review. Most find two standards: the restricted review (contrdle restreint) and the regular review
(contrdle normal). Some authors claim that in some cases the administrative judges apply a
third, more intrusive standard, which they call maximum review (contr6le maximum).
Restricted review applies to situations where the administration has discretionary powers.
The judge will only annul the decision where there is a "manifest error of appraisal" (erreur
manifeste d'appr&ication).
I 11. See Conseil d'Etat (CE), Feb. 16, 2009, Requte n. 274000; Pudas v. Suede, AI25-A
Eur. Ct. H.R. 83, 94 (1987); CE Sect.,June 9, 1978, Requte n. 05911; CE Sect.,June 27,
2007, Requte n. 300143. The Conseil d'Etat ruled that in the case of fines imposed by the
administration, judicial review is unlimited, even in the absence of a specific legislative
provision. Conseil d'ltat (CE) Feb. 16, 2009, Requte n. 274000. This holding might be the
result of pressure from the European Court of Human Rights that had already decided
administrative sanctions can only be imposed when unlimited judicial review is available.
Pudas v. Suede, A125-A Eur. Ct. H.R. 83, 94 (1987). The review of administrative
sanctions is evolving towards more intense review. From the 1970s, courts started to subject
the amount of the sanction to the standard of "manifest error of appraisal." CE Sect., June
9, 1978, Requte n. 05911, Lebon. Currently, they do not hesitate to assess the
proportionality of the sanction and to reform it. Conseil d'Etat (CE), June 27, 2007,
Requte n. 300143.
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the modern regulatory welfare state. Independent regulatory agencies fit
awkwardly into the French legal structure, as does any type of expert-based
regulation, such as the general rules governing air and water pollution.
The French courts have not created any new concepts in their review of
technical, complex decisions taken by regulatory agencies and ministries.
They apply the same concepts that they developed in the review of non-
specialized administrative actions. 112 Theoretically, French administrative
courts apply a deferential standard of review to highly technical 13 or
politically sensitive cases. 114 In practice, however, they are clearly less
prone to find such instances when compared to their Canadian and
American counterparts.
A good example of this tendency to overlook technical complexities is
the case law on mergers. 115 The Conseil d'tat has always applied "regular
review" (contr6le normal) when considering the relevant decisions taken by the
French Minister, or since a recent reform, by the antitrust agency. It
carried out a regular review of technical assessments as well as factfinding.
As a consequence, no margin of appreciation is left to administrative
authorities. The Conseil d'Etat has reviewed for correctness the
identification of the relevant market and the evaluation of anticompetitive
112. See Didier Th~ophile & Hugues Parmentier, L'dtendue du Contr6le Juridictionnel dans le
Contentieux du Contrdle des Concentrations en Droit Interne et Communautaire, 2006 CONCURRENCES:
REVUE DES DROITS DE LA CONCURRENCE 39, 41 (2006) (noting that French law does not
have the concept of "complex economic assessments," that leads to deferential review under
European law-and, until recently, under Italian law. Occasionally, the rapporteurs publics do
refer to some inadequacies in the tools ofjudicial review to address regulatory problems. See,
e.g., CE Sect., Apr. 27, 2009, Requte n. 312741.
113. See, e.g., CE Ass., Apr. 27, 1951, Rec. Lebon 236 (applying restricted review on
whether a hair lotion was poisonous); Conseil d'Etat (CE) Oct. 14, 1960, Rec. Lebon 529,
Syndicat Agricole de Lalande-de-Pomerol (applying restricted review to determine whether
a wine was worthy of an appellation controle). More recently, some telecommunication
regulation cases have also received restricted review due to their complexity. See, e.g.,
Conseil d'Etat (CE) July 10, 2006, Requate n. 274455 (applying restricted review to
determine the distribution of the costs of the universalization of the service); CE, Dec. 5,
2005, Requte n. 277441, 277443-277445 (applying restricted review to the establishment
of a price floor regulation to dominant companies).
114. Two examples are the review of the so-called mesure de haute police. See Conseil d'Etat
(CE)July 25, 1985, Requte n. 68151; Conseil d'Etat (CE), Feb. 3, 1975, Requete n. 94108.
These cases dealt with measures against foreigners on French soil and refusals to apply an
administrative sanction due to the principle of prosecutorial discretion (opportunit des
poursuites). See Conseil d'Etat (CE), Dec. 30, 2002, Requite n. 216358; Conseil d'tat (CE),
July 28, 2000, Requte n. 199773.
115. Technically complex decisions reviewed for correctness are also common outside
the realm of antitrust. In the regulation of telecommunications, see, e.g., Conseil d'Etat (CE)




effects, 116 assessed the very existence of a merger, 1 7 and established the
criteria under which making an "exception for a failing firm" could be
accepted.118 In the opinion that inaugurated this approach, the rapporteur
public Jacques-Henri Stahl argued that the relevant market is an "objective
notion that is imposed upon economic actors and the antitrust authority,
which has no leeway to choose one market over another." ' 19 The notion of
a relevant market may very well be objective, but the definition of which
market is relevant for a given merger operation is often a highly technical
and debatable issue that administrative institutions are usually better placed
to address.
Likewise, the political component of many regulatory decisions is not
officially recognized in court. This is particularly clear in the domain of
statutory construction. Canadian and American courts defer systematically
to agencies' interpretation of ambiguous terms in legislation. French
courts, however, usually claim legitimacy to interpret these ambiguous
terms. 120 They view such concepts as "legal" because they are in the
statutory text; therefore, the courts can interpret them. French courts
define the realm of law broadly, allowing for far-reaching review. Thus, in
cases where Canadian and American courts would acknowledge that
agencies are engaged in policymaking and should be left alone, French
courts tend to view agencies as making legal decisions that are therefore
reviewable.
Indeed, French courts only vary the intensity of review in instances of
legal classification of facts (qualification juridique des faits). Claims of direct
violation of law (generally understood rules or unwritten principles) or
wrongful constructions of statutes 121 always give rise to a review for
correctness. To illustrate the different approaches in France and Canada,
compare the Conseil d'Etat opinion in GSD Gestion122 with the Canadian
Supreme Court opinion in Pezim. 123 The cases concern the interpretation
by the financial market regulator of similar statutory provisions. In
116. See Conseil d'tat (CE), Oct. 6 2000, Requete n. 216645; CE Sect., Apr. 9, 1999,
Requ~te n. 201853.
117. SeeCE Sect., May 31, 2000, Requte n. 213161.
118. .fSee CE Sect., Feb. 6, 2004, Requate n. 249267.
119. See CE Sect., Apr. 9 1999, Requite n. 201853.
120. See Conseil d'tat (CE),June 7, 1999, Requite n. 193438 (broadcasting authority's
domain); Conseil d'ltat (CE), May 18, 1998, Requite n. 182244 (same); Conseil d'Etat
(CE),July 30, 1997, Requfte n. 153402 (same).
12 1. The "wrong construction of statutes" is one of the instances of error of law (erreur de
droit) alongside decisions grounded on an invalid or revoked law.
122. See Conseil d'Etat (CE) Feb. 4, 2005, Requite n. 269001.
123. See Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557
(Can.).
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Canada, the statute required companies to disclose any "material change"
in their business or operations. 124 In France, a similar obligation existed in
the case of "changes in the characteristic elements" that had been
previously reported to the regulator. In both cases, the courts upheld the
decisions of the administrative authorities to levy fines on operators deemed
to have violated this obligation. 125 However, the Canadian Supreme Court
did so by applying a deferential standard of review and by affirming that
the interpretation of the expression "material change" in the relevant
legislation required specific knowledge of financial markets.12 6 The Conseil
d'Etat and its rapporteurpublic made no such finding. Subjecting the decision
of the administrative authority to non-deferential review, it interpreted the
statute directly, finding that the agency did not commit an error of law or of
appreciation when it found that "changes in the characteristic elements" of
the company had occurred.
In general, French jurists are comparatively less likely to accept claims
that administrative authorities are best suited to deal with technical issues.
Although such claims do occasionally appear in some opinions of the
rapporteurs publics, 127 they are much rarer than in Canadian and American
case law. As a consequence, both democratic legitimacy and deference to
expertise play a comparatively less pronounced role in French judicial
review of administrative action. Under the influence of the European
Union (EU) and ECHR, rights have risen in importance, 128 but there is
little straightforward confrontation with democratic values or technical
competence as grounds for either review or deference.
Part of the reason for this difference is the relative paucity of cases
dealing with the validity of rules as opposed to adjudications in individual
cases. Nevertheless, such cases do exist. For example, one case required
the state to act under an EU directive. It held that silence or inaction by
the minister could be an abuse of power just as much as action. 129 A
second case involved a quite aggressive review of a substantive rule that set
124. Seeid.at 575.
125. Conseil d'tat (CE), Feb. 4, 2005, Requfte n. 269001. In both the French and
Canadian cases, the relevant statutes brought further precision and examples of what could
constitute a "material change" or "changes on the characteristic elements."
126. See Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557,
588 (Can.).
127. See, e.g., Conseil d'Etat (CE), Apr. 27, 2009, Requfte n. 312741; CE Sect., Feb. 25,
2005, Requfte n. 247866.
128. See generally MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL TRuNSFORMATIONS: THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS OF EUROPE (2009) (elaborating on the situation in
France).
129. See CE Ass., Feb. 3, 1989, Requate n. 74052.
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doctors' fees. 130 The case turned on an interpretation of the principle of
equality. 131 The decision takes on the substantive merit of a policy in a
fairly functional way even if the ground is the familiar one of abuse of
power.
For one class of statutes, however, the legislature has reacted to the
administrative courts' lack of economic expertise simply by denying them
jurisdiction. Some disputes over antitrust and financial regulation are
heard in the civil courts. 132 The law gives first instance jurisdiction to the
Court of Appeals of Paris-a court with expertise in business law.133 The
civil courts have provided non-deferential review in cases concerning
anticompetitive behavior. 1
34
130. See CE Ass.,July 16, 2007, Requ~te n. 293229; see alsoJ. Boucher & B. Bourgeois-
Machureau, Redefinition des regles de calcul des redevances pour service rendu, 35 ACTUALITE
JURIDIQUE DROrr ADMINISTRATIF 1439, 1807 (2007); L'HEDONISME AU CONSEIL D'ETAT,
RICHER & AssoCIES, http://www.cabinet-richer.com/articles/hedonisme-conseil-etat.htm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2014). The Conseil d'ctat reviewed a decree that set the fees charged to
private doctors for the use of public hospitals. The decision examined the substance of the
decree and held that the government could take account of the economic benefit to the
doctors of using these facilities, as well as the hospital's cost of production. Commentators
point to the case as an example of the Conseil d'ttat's willingness to engage in economic
reasoning. However, the case looks more like a controversy over the division of the rents or
excess profits of certain medical specialties, such as plastic surgery.
131. French judges work with a number of "general principles of the law" to resolve
cases. Besides equality, other general principles of the law deal with liberty (e.g., freedom of
trade), security (e.g., right to judicial review, right to administrative appeal, natural justice,
bias, non-retroactivity, the obligation to revoke an illegal act, the right to live a normal life),
respect for the dead (e.g., for doctor's ethical obligations), the continuity of public services,
etc. See LASSER, supra note 127; see also Susan Rose-Ackerman & Thomas Perroud,
Poliqymaking and Public Law in France: Public Participation, Ageny Independence, and Impact
Assessment, 19 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 225, 228 (2013).
132. See, e.g., Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 86-
224DC,Jan. 23, 1987,J.O. 924 (Fr.). The general rule is that the review of the decisions of
the independent administrative agencies rests with the administrative jurisdiction, but the
rule may be derogated by law "in the interest of good administration ofjustice."
133. The review of civil courts is always intense under French law because such courts
are the "guardians of fundamental liberties." See CODE CIL [C. civ.] art. 561 (Fr.); Cour
de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Jan. 31, 2006, Bull. civ. IV,
No. 134 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com.,June 29,
2007, Bull. civ. IV, No. 1020 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] com., Sept. 26, 2006, Bull. civ. IV, No. 8 (Fr.).
134. The decision in the Sandoz case illustrated such intense review. The Competition
Council had imposed fines on Sandoz for abuse of its dominant position. The Cour d'appel
provided a thorough review of Competition Council's ruling. See Cour d'appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., Mar. 30, 2004, BOCCRF 2004, (Fr.); see also Cour
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., Dec. 20, 2005, RG 2006, 01498, (Fr.).
However, even in those areas, although the civil courts review individual cases, review of
secondary legislation remains at the Conseil d'Etat, which also reviews draft rules in its
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The French administrative courts engage in stringent review of
adjudication inside the executive and the agencies, but this review does not
reflect a nuanced view of the nature of expert policymaking under
delegated authority. It is generally embedded in a traditional framework
that fails to acknowledge the political nature of these policy decisions.
Either there is no law to apply-so certain administrative actions are
entirely devoid of review-or the courts hold that the action falls into a
conventional category and can be reviewed like any other case.
If review does occur, the Conseil d'Itat's impact on government and
agency policymaking is problematic for several reasons. First, the Conseil
d'Etat's decisions have traditionally been very concise. Conclusions are
often left unexplained beyond references to legal texts. Courts make crucial
decisions concerning the regulation of important areas like
telecommunications or energy in a few short paragraphs. 
13 5
Second, in most cases the Conseil d'Itat does not discuss opposing
arguments or explain why its reasons are better than the contrary reasons.
The lack of dissent compounds this problem along with the secrecy of the
deliberations. Third, if the Conseil d'ltat characterizes an issue as merely a
legal question, this tends to hide the fact that there is room for alternative
interpretations. If the legislation is ambiguous, the courts tend to choose an
option and claim that it is the only legally possible solution. Political
choices are presented as legal impositions. Fourth, open-ended "legal"
concepts like "proportionality" and "general interest" empower courts to
make their own balance of interests when they decide cases that are
essentially political in nature.
However, there is a basic limitation to the claim that the French courts
provide overly aggressive review of executive and agency policymaking. In
spite of permissive standing and jurisdiction doctrines, much government
policymaking is made through decrees and ordinances and is seldom
subject to judicial review. In such cases, the only review the Conseil d'tat
provides is ex ante in its advisory capacity. It reviews draft secondary
legislation from both executive departments and independent agencies
before the documents are issued. Although the review could be wide-
ranging, in practice, it appears to focus on the rule's legal basis. These
advisory capacity.
135. This problem is partially mitigated by the reasons given by the rapporteur public, a
member of the Conseil d'ltat who proposes a solution to the case. The rapporteur public's
reasons are often longer and more developed than those in the actual decision. However,
the reasons given by the rapporteur public are not necessarily the reasons of the Conseil d'Itat
itself. The Conseil d'tat does occasionally issue long opinions, but this does not yet seem to
be a trend. See, e.g., Conseil d'ltat (CE), Dec. 21, 2012, Requte n. 353856; Conseil d'ltat
(CE), Dec. 21, 2012, Requte n. 362347, 363542, 363703 (jointly issued).
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reports, unlike the Conseil d'Etat's judicial decisions, are not made public
unless the government wants to release them. Thus, one can only examine
a biased sample. However, available examples are sufficient to conclude
that they are similar to Conseil d'Etat judicial opinions. Subsequently,
decrees and ordinances do sometimes come to court in a lawsuit, but most
of them are not given in-depth review. Given the current state of French
public law, this seems adequate, but it is a second-best solution that




Even though French and Italian courts now apply a similarly stringent
standard of review to the cases they decide, their routes to this result were
very different. In France, there was no "period of deference," and strong
review has been consistently applied since the inception of the decentralized
regulatory state. Conversely, in Italy, courts in two different periods gave
deferential review to decisions that involved technical assessments only to
settle recently on stringent review. Whereas the French Conseil d'Etat has
virtually ignored the difficulties of reviewing the decisions of specialized
regulatory institutions, Italian courts first acknowledged these difficulties
and then ignored them without explaining their change of position. The
end result is the same: a situation in which the administrative courts have
done little to accommodate public law doctrines to the realities of the
modern regulatory state. This does not mean that the French and Italian
approaches to judicial review are problematic overall. However, they
privilege the protection of legality to the detriment of other goals, such as
administrative efficiency, technical competence, and political
accountability.
The more stringent review applied by both France and Italy might be
due to the fact that both countries have a separate administrative system of
tribunals. That institutional feature reduces one of the concerns about
generalist courts carrying out intrusive scrutiny of administrative decisions
in ways that could violate the separation of powers. Our claim, however, is
that the institutional capabilities of the French and Italian administrative
courts are no stronger than those of the ordinary courts in Canada and the
United States. All are poorly adapted to address technically complex or
politically sensitive issues.
If one accepts this claim, then the Canadian courts seem to have done
136. For a more complete discussion of these issues, see Rose-Ackerman & Perroud,
supra note 130.
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the best at both acknowledging the reality of modern executive
policymaking and finding a limited role for judicial review. If the nature of
the issue and the institutional features of the agency suggest that it is better
placed to make the challenged decision, Canadian courts will limit
themselves to reasonableness review. Judicial review of substance in the
United States, on one side, and in Italy and France, on the other, is more
problematic. Review in the United States acknowledges the need to defer
to agency expertise, but because courts often review generic rules before
they are enforced, they tend to look quite carefully at the consistency
between agency rules and statutes, even when the judges have little
expertise. Sometimes, as in the review of health, safety, and financial
standards, they review technical decision as if they had knowledge that
they, in fact, lack. In France and Italy, review of rules and regulations is
less common, but this means that major policy initiatives are not reviewed
at all while individual decisions of less overall importance obtain very
stringent oversight.
11. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Aggressive judicial review of the substance of regulatory policy can lead
to undemocratic and technically flawed results. However, that does not
imply that courts should simply decline to rule on challenges to regulatory
actions. Instead, they can concentrate on the process and check to be sure
that policy is made in an accountable, transparent, and responsive manner
that draws on necessary expertise.
Procedural requirements can balance the three types of legitimacy that
we outlined above: democratic legitimacy, competence, and the protection
of rights. Through their enforcement, courts can give sufficient leeway to
the technical and political choices of government bodies and at the same
time assure that the decisions are both transparent and well-informed. Of
course, courts will not be able to evaluate the administrative process
without some knowledge of the substance and of the political interests and
technical knowledge at stake. Nevertheless, checking process and assessing
policy are not equivalent.
In our case studies, the publication of administrative rules and decrees is
taken for granted. Outside of certain national security areas, these
advanced democracies publish all officially promulgated rules. Over and
above such basic transparency, the important issues concern the
accountability and competence of policymaking in the executive and the
agencies. In this section we examine how our four jurisdictions deal with
two centrally important procedural guarantees: (i) the duty to give reasons
and the (ii) right to be heard or to participate.
First, the duty to give reasons arises from fundamental rule of law
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principle under which the state should not enforce the law against persons
without explaining why they must bear the relevant cost. 137  This
requirement is part of the general principle that public officials, as well as
private citizens, are subject to the law and hence must justify their exercises
of power over others. In administrative law, this principle is most strongly
institutionalized when a public agency has adjudicatory responsibilities that
are analogous to the activities of courts. Either the state determines that an
individual has violated a law, or it justifies a cost imposed on an individual
by demonstrating that the cost is legally permitted or is balanced by a
public benefit. The agency operates under an existing statute or piece of
secondary legislation, and it explains to the citizens-and to any court that
later reviews the action-how its actions are consistent both with the legal
text and with individual rights.
In addition to the protection of individual rights, compliance with the
duty to give reasons also serves broader goals of transparency and political
legitimacy. The obligation to explain decisions is a corollary of the public
administration's policymaking activities. If an agency makes substantive
choices that affect the use of public resources and the behavior of regulated
entities, citizens should have access to the reasons for those choices. If the
government presents clear and comprehensive reasons for its actions,
citizens will be more aware of the importance of choices, even if the
decisions involve complex, technical matters. Furthermore, if citizens can
access the courts, the agency's stated reasons will help non-expert judges
understand what is at stake. 138
Second, in adjudication, the right of participation usually translates into
a right to be heard, which is linked to the protection of individual rights.
Participation in rulemaking processes has a broader justification. It is a
source of democratic legitimacy that allows citizens to influence the
adoption of policies that reflect their beliefs and interests. Broad
participation rights require administrators to accept input and data from
those concerned with agency action. Agencies can lower the cost of outside
participation by their own efforts of outreach. Such actions can help
mitigate the information asymmetry that arises if the regulated industry
dominates the consultation process. In ensuring a better balance, rights of
participation can help make administrative decisions both more democratic
and better informed-enhancing competence. 139
137. SeeJeremy Waldron, Essay, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REv. 1, 57-61
(2008) (explaining that this requirement is canonical in discussions of the rule of law).
138. Reason-giving can also provide guidance for non-parties to an adjudication or for
those subject to a regulation, and it makes it harder for an agency to act precipitously.
139. The extent to which public participation leads to better regulation is much debated.
Some have argued that the uninformed general public can mislead the experts, who should
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Three issues are especially relevant. First, to what extent do courts in
our four jurisdictions require these two procedural mechanisms in agency
decisionmaking? Are they general obligations affecting every
administrative action, or are they confined only to some of them? Second,
if adjudications make policy, do they require greater procedural protections
than adjudications that simply resolve individual cases without affecting
overall policy? Third, what is the justification for the enforcement of
procedural mechanisms? Are the procedures linked to the goals of
democratic legitimacy and competence, or are they understood only as
legal tools to ensure the protection of individual rights?
We begin with the two cases where procedural guarantees are taken
particularly seriously. In the United States, procedural requirements are
integral to rulemaking through the process of notice-and-comment.
Reason-giving and participation rights are routes to democratic legitimacy,
and not just legal tools to protect the individual against state overreaching.
In the last two decades, Italy has increased the rights of participation in
rulemaking processes and has established a duty to give reasons that is
relatively widespread, but that duty does not reach rulemaking, except in
the case of the independent agencies.
We then contrast these two cases where process is important with the
two other jurisdictions in which these guarantees are less powerful. In the
absence of general rules of procedure, Canadian courts distinguish between
adjudication and rulemaking. They review process more carefully in the
former than in the latter. In France the courts have been reluctant to adopt
a general duty to give reasons, adopting the requirement only in a certain
number of decisions, - mostly connected to the restriction of rights.
However, the French Conseil Constitutionnel has begun to enforce
participation rights in the area of environmental law under the Charter for
the Environment, which is appended to the French Constitution. Some
statutes are beginning to increase participation in French policymaking, but
these initiatives are relatively new or are limited to particular areas of
government activity.
A. United States
In the United States, both participation rights and the duty to give
reasons are central to the notice-and-comment provisions of the APA.
140
therefore be "isolated" in their process of decisionmaking. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LAWs OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005). For a critique of the
antidemocratic nature of this argument, see Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A
Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1071, 1108 (2006) (book review).
140. APA, Pub. L. No. 79-404, §§ 4(a)-(b), 60 Stat. 237, 238-39 (codified as amended at
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The focus is on political legitimacy and competence, not the protection of
individual rights. The provisions apply to rules made under delegated
authority in federal statutes. 14' A typical rulemaking process includes both
the interpretation of statutory terms and policymaking choices derived from
the statutory text. Sometimes the line between these categories is quite
blurry. Participation is open-ended in notice-and-comment procedures
while in adjudications it can be limited to those with an individual stake in
the outcome. The procedural requirements for both rulemaking and
adjudication are subject to judicial review. They are not just
recommendations for good governance.
1. Participation in Rulemaking
If an agency engages in notice-and-comment rulemaking, it must
organize the process so that it is open to public input. 142 This aspect of the
statute has become so routinized that it seldom generates lawsuits so long as
the agency issued its rule using notice-and-comment. However, certain
substantive policy choices are exempt from the notice-and-comment
process, 143 and agencies can make policy choices outside that process by
issuing interpretive rules and policy statements. 144 Some agencies that are
legally exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements,
nevertheless, use them to enhance their public legitimacy. For example, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development issued its own regulations
that require the Department to use notice-and-comment rulemaking.
45
Outside of such voluntary actions, controversies arise over the range of
choices that require notice-and-comment and over the legal status of
agency actions that are exempt.146 These challenges, however, concentrate
on the overall scope of the law and do not isolate public participation from
other requirements. Agencies do not limit the range of people and
organizations that can submit comments.
Comment periods are usually several months in length and are routinely
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c)) (2012).
141. The provision includes numerous important exceptions, most notably for benefit
programs. In some cases more formal, court-like procedures apply under §§ 556 and 557,
but these are seldom used unless explicitly required by statute. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57
(2012).
142. Id. at § 553(b)-(c).
143. See § 553(a) (exempting military or foreign affairs, agency management or
personnel, and loans, grants, benefits, and contracts).
144. See § 553(b)(3)(A)-(B).
145. 24 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2013).
146. On the exceptions, see Am. Hosp. Ass'n. v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir.
1987), and Cmty. Nutrition v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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extended if outsiders request an extension. Agencies do not want to risk a
court challenge claiming that they did not consult sufficiently. The number
of comments received is sometimes very large, but many rulemaking
dockets generate little interest. A Forest Service rulemaking docket
generated more than one million comments, although many were form
letters.147 In contrast, a study of eleven rulemaking dockets found that the
number of comments ranged from 1 to 268;148 another study of forty-two
dockets found that the average number of comments was thirty.1
49
2. Review of Policmaking Processes
The courts enforce the reason-giving requirement included in the notice-
and-comment provisions of the APA and can strike down an agency action
that is "arbitrary and capricious."' 150  This is a deferential substantive
standard, but courts have often applied it in a way that concentrates on the
rulemaking process, turning it into a procedural safeguard. The APA also
instructs the courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . found
to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law."'' Thus a
court can void an agency action that is procedurally flawed even if it seems
substantively reasonable. In practice, however, procedural failures are
often connected with substantive inadequacies. For example, the Supreme
Court has voided decisions that were not accompanied by logical
reasoning, including agencies' failures to elaborate when and how it relies
on predictive judgments or uses broad models or tests. 152 It has disallowed
decisions that did not take into consideration an important aspect of the
problem, such as the costs of a given public policy or factual circumstances
that were crucial to the decision. 153 Failure to evaluate important policy
alternatives led the Court to vacate and remand a deregulatory policy in
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
147. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before A New
President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 557,623 (2003).
148. Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates?
Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8J. PUB. ADMIN. & THEORY 245,252 (1998).
149. William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in
Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 71 (2004).
For a review of the empirical literature on participation in U.S. rulemaking, see ROSE-
ACKERMAN, supra note 1 at 219-27.
150. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
151. Id. at § 706(2)(D).
152. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
153. See Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 662
(1980).
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Co. 154 In the review of rules, the federal courts have imposed a broad
obligation on agencies to consider alternatives that are significant or
important. 
155
The duty to give reasons for both rules and adjudications is reinforced in
the United States by the so-called Cheney doctrine, under which "the
grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those
upon which the record discloses that its action was based."' 156 The courts
will not reach out and articulate their own reasons. That case, which pre-
dated the APA, involved the reorganization of a public utility holding
company, not a generic rulemaking. However, the Supreme Court
continues to follow this doctrine even for rules and adjudications that are
not made using formal on-the-record procedures. The case does not
impose court-like procedures; it only requires coherent reasons. Thus, even
though the case itself dealt with a narrow agency decision, it operates to
enhance policymaking accountability through limited judicial review. 157 If
the federal courts find the reasons inadequate, they remand the decision to
the agency to produce a new rule accompanied by a better informed and
reasoned document.158 The courts will not take on the task of reason-giving
themselves. 159 Thus, even if review is nominally substantive, the effect of
such decisions is to push the agency to use procedures that produce
outcomes that are more capable ofjustification.
154. 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983).
155. The classic case dealing with so-called "hard look" review is Ethyl Corp. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). The case for
such review is presented in Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 523-24 (1974). His opinion in Ethyl and that ofJudge David
Bazelon have framed the debate with Judge Bazelon, arguing that judges should not get
involved in a review of technical details. Efforts by the D.C. Circuit to impose additional
procedural requirements on agencies were halted after Vermont rankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978).
156. Sec. &Exch. Comm'nv. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
157. Chenery, 318 U.S. at 88. The Supreme Court argues that it would violate the
separation of powers for it to substitute its own policy reasoning for that of the agency.
158. The courts do not impose a similar standard on statutes. They are subject only to a
minimal rational basis standard. For a discussion of these contrasting approaches and a
comparison with German, South African, and EU jurisprudence, see SUSAN ROSE-
ACKERMAN, STEFANIE EGIDY, & JAMES FoWKES, "DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING": THE
UNITED STATES, SOUTH AFRICA, GERMANY, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (forthcoming
2014).
159. This negative stance can sometimes be quite intrusive. The courts often remand to
the agency with a fairly clear message about what future agency actions will be acceptable.
For example, in EME Homer Cio Generation, L.P. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 696 F. 3d 7,
37 (D.C. Cir. 2012), the Court of Appeals remanded to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) with a very explicit statement about how the EPA could satisfy the court's
interpretation of the Clean Air Act.
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3. Review ofAgencies' Statutory Construction
Reason-giving is also relevant to judicial review of agencies' statutory
constructions under step two of Chevron. In Chevron, the Court affirmed that
the EPA had "advanced a reasonable explanation for its conclusion that the
regulations serve the environmental objectives" of the Clean Air Act and
that "its reasoning is supported by the public record developed in the
rulemaking process, as well as by certain private studies."1 60 The reasoning
approximates the arbitrary and capricious standard, but applied to
statutory interpretation rather than policymaking under a clear legal
mandate.1 6 1 Once again this standard appears to be a substantive
judgment, but as it has developed, it has taken on a procedural character.
The Court does not always defer as fully as it did under Chevron. Rather,
it may use a weaker standard, articulated in Skidmore and Mead, where it
accepts an agency's statutory interpretation if it is persuaded by the
"validity of its reasoning."' 162 In Christensen v. Harris Count, the Supreme
Court stated that the interpretations of the agency "are 'entitled to
respect' . . . but only to the extent that those interpretations have the 'power
to persuade." ' 63 Although, on its face, this looks like a less deferential
substantive standard, a procedural aspect is embedded in the post-Chevron
cases. There are two aspects to these decisions. In Mead, the Supreme
Court quoted the language of Skidmore that highlighted the "thoroughness
evident in its consideration."' 164  The more attentive and careful the
agency's analysis, the more probable it is that it will be entitled to
deference. Second, if Congress has mandated notice-and-comment
rulemaking, the Court will read the statutory text as signaling intent to
delegate policy choices to the agency. Hence, in Chevron, the Court's
deference arose in part, from the agency's use of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, a process not used to determine the tariff classification at issue
in Mead. Although the opinion in Chevron does not explicitly refer to EPA
procedures, they form the background of the agency's rule. Mead makes
this background condition clear. Congress's intent to delegate is inferred
from the process required. The authority to interpret the law could be
delegated by requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking, adjudication, or
160. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984).
161. See, e.g, Nat'l Cable & Telecoms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
980-81 (2005); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); Smiley v. Citibank
(South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996).
162. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 219; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
163. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
164. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (1944)); see also
Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995).
2014]
ADMhVSTRATIVE LA WREVIEW
"some other indication of comparable congressional intent."1 65 If the
agency engages in a process that requires notice, hearings, and reason-
giving, then the courts will be more likely to accept the agency's
interpretation of its mandate. The reasons articulated by the agency do not
need to persuade the court that it has selected the most accurate reading of
the law. The interpretation just needs to be reasonable. Substance and
process intertwine in a way that is consistent with our own views of the
proper role of the courts-deferential review of the substance of policy and
of the interpretation of the statute so long as the agency has carried out a
process that invites broad participation, canvasses the relevant technical
material, and ends up with a reasoned policy judgment. 66
4. Mhat Are Reasons For?
Although reason-giving in the U.S. is clearly bound up with democracy
and expertise, it is also often invoked as a way for the courts to be sure that
agency action is consistent with congressional will. Two conflicting notions
of democratic accountability are in play. Under the first, the courts check
to be sure that the executive is carrying out the congressional will. Reasons
help the courts determine if agencies are overreaching their legislative
mandates. The second emphasizes the need for agencies to be accountable
to the public directly, not just through the mediation of the legislative
process and the voting booth. Both of these values exist in American
administrative law, but sometimes one and sometimes the other come to
the fore. The second model, however, is the one of most interest to us; it
provides a way for courts to help enhance the operation of the executive-
not just as a reflection of legislative will, but also as a legitimate policymaker
in its own right. 167
For an example of the first notion of democratic accountability consider
Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 168 Both the
majority opinion by Justice Scalia and the dissent focus on the reasons
given by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for changing its
policy on "fleeting expletives" toward more stringent enforcement of their
occurrence in the broadcast media. The majority opinion is only
165. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227.
166. Notice, however, that such notice-and-comment procedures are sufficient but not
necessary under Alead. The Court leaves vague what the "other indications" might be, and
this lack of clarity provoked a sharp dissent from Justice Scalia. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at
239 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
167. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Wy Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1
J.L. EcON. & ORG. 81, 94 (1985).
168. 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
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concerned with whether the agency has "good reasons" for the new policy.
The views of the public on the adequacy of the reasons are not relevant.
169
Even the dissent by Justice Breyer focuses on the way reason-giving permits
the Court to review the agency's action. He does, however, stress that the
agency should go through a process of learning "through reasoned
argument" that would have been provided by the notice-and-comment
provisions of the APA.170 That process, of course, might require open-
ended hearings to get public input and reason-giving designed for both the
court and the public. According to Justice Scalia, democratic
accountability here means consistency with the will of Congress. 171 The
Court says that it cannot check for consistency with the statute unless the
FCC provides it with a better statement of reasons. The remedy is remand
to the agency to provide reasons that could satisfy the courts.
Cases that remand an agency decision because of the failure to give
adequate notice or to hold hearings fall into the second category, stressing
public accountability. A rule may also be sent back to the agency if the
reasons reflect inadequate responses to public comments. An internal
guideline can be challenged when applied in a particular case. The only
way to avoid that possibility is to promulgate a rule through a public notice-
and-comment process. 1
72
If an agency acts too precipitously and provides poor justifications for its
actions, it may have to revisit a policy choice. For example, in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers' Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. the
Supreme Court held that the speedy repeal of the passive restraint rule for
motor vehicles was arbitrary and capricious. 173 An agency may change its
view of the public interest, and this change can be related to a change in
the party and policy priorities of the President. However, the new
administration must provide reasons for the change beyond a simple appeal
to political shifts. Repeal of a rule requires the same notice-and-comment
169. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)
(the agency "need not demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that the reasons for the new
policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices ... that the agency believes [the
new policy] to be better"). See also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of
Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973) (finding that the agency had not stated adequate reasons
for changing its policy). The justices do not refer to a need for accountability to the general
public or for transparency; rather, reason-giving permits the courts to "complete the task of
judicial review." Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. at 805-06.
170. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 548 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 524-25 (Scalia, J). This portion of the opinion was not joined by Justice
Kennedy, so it only expresses the view of four justices.
172. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1988).




process as promulgation and faces the same standards of review. 174
Although the State Farm decision concentrates on substantive failures, the
argument has a procedural base. The agency held hearings and accepted
comments, but it then rushed through the change and did not carefully
consider the alternatives. Even the non-expert Court was able to critique
the agency's lack of care. It did not order a specific result, but it voided the
recession and remanded to the agency.
Hence, in the United States, the duty to give reasons when promulgating
legally binding rules is deeply bound up with the democratic acceptability
of policymaking in the executive. The courts distinguish between the
justifications needed for policy made under delegated authority and for
legislative enactments. As the Court stated in a footnote in State Farm:
The Department of Transportation suggests that the
arbitrary[]and[]capricious standard requires no more than the minimum
rationality a statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under the Due
Process Clause. We do not view as equivalent the presumption of
constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by Congress and the
presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory
mandate. 
175
5. Adjudication and Policymaking
Democratic accountability is much more difficult to achieve for policies
made through adjudications than through rulemaking. Policy can be made
by means of incremental case-by-case adjudications. However, even if the
courts require agencies to justify individual decisions, the courts may be
unable to track and review policy changes that occur gradually over time
through the accumulation of individual adjudications. Unlike the clear
rescission of a rule in State Farm or the changed interpretation of a statutory
term in Chevron, notice-and-comment rulemaking is not an option for policy
built up through individual adjudications. This generic problem of case-by-
case policymaking might be somewhat countered by requiring or
permitting participation in agency adjudications by those concerned about
the underlying policy but not directly affected by the individual
administrative decision. However, in the United States such individuals
and businesses would be unlikely to obtain standing in court after the
agency acts; hence, agencies face no legal pressure to consult widely. 176
174. Id. at41-42.
175. Id. at 43 n.9.
176. The reverse, however, is true. If a plaintiff has standing in court, then it can raise
any type of challenge to the agency action, including claims that are not related to reasons it
was granted standing. See Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
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By acknowledging the broader policy consequences of adjudications,
courts could draw attention to the more general aspect of the duty to give
reasons: one that is related to ideals of democratic accountability and
technical competence. In other words, if the statute contains vague or
open-ended language and if policy is de facto made by administrative
agency adjudications, then these exercises of agency discretion ought to be
open to judicial review. Such review would not just address questions of
statutory construction, but it could also consider the democratic legitimacy
of agency procedures. An agency could carry out an open and transparent
adjudicatory process not just to inform the courts, but also to involve and
inform the public.
The contesting justifications for reason-giving, based either on individual
rights or on democratic accountability, suggest that there is a lacuna in U.S.
administrative law. In the executive, policy can be made through
rulemaking procedures or through the build-up of case law. The U.S. EPA
operates largely through rulemaking; the Antitrust Division of the
Department ofJustice uses case-by-case adjudication. If an agency makes
policy through rulemaking, it must provide reasons for its policies. In
contrast, if it operates through case-by-case adjudications, the agency is
legally required to provide reasons only in two cases. First, it must provide
notice and "a brief statement of the grounds for denial" when it turns down
"a written application, petition, or other request of an interested person."177
Second, it must provide reasons under the formal adjudication procedures
of the APA that apply to "every case of adjudication required by statute to
be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."'
178 If
an agency anticipates a court challenge, it would be wise to articulate
reasons in all cases. Nevertheless, the reasons need not articulate the broad
policy behind individual cases. That policy builds up through a series of
cases and enforcement actions. Each case may be justified with a statement
of reasons, but the overall policy may never be open to public comment or
be justified in a transparent manner. Rather than subjecting its policies to
an open notice-and-comment process, the agency may prefer to govern
through adjudication. 179 Review of the rulemaking process is central to
U.S. administrative law, but policies developed through case-by-case
adjudication need not incorporate broad public input and are not subject to
review except insofar as they affect individual cases. The focus is on
U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
177. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2012).
178. Id. at § 554(a). The reason-giving requirement is in 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A); see also
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 419-20 (1971).




violations of rights and on consistency with statutory purposes, not on
accountability to citizens other than those directly affected.
B. Itay
In Italian law, courts have evolved from a traditional orientation that
linked procedural safeguards to the protection of rights (the so-called
funzione garantistica). They now acknowledge that in some cases these
mechanisms can enhance both the democratic accountability and the
efficiency of public administration. This trend is clearer and more effective
in the review of independent agencies, where courts have held that
procedural guarantees compensate for the agencies' lack of legitimacy and
help them to produce better regulations.
1. The Traditional Approach: Procedural Safeguards and Their Funzione
Garantistica
Before 1990, there was no generalized statutory duty to give reasons in
Italian law. The 1948 Constitution, Article 111, establishes such a duty
only for judicial decisions. However, even in the absence of specific legal
provisions, administrative courts began to recognize the need for a
statement of reasons in cases that led to a direct violation of individual
rights. Administrative decisions could thus be reviewed and annulled for
excess of power (eccesso di potere) if reasons were insufficient (insufficienza della
motivazione) or contradictory (contraddittorietd della motivazione).
Eventually, the 1990 Italian Administrative Procedure Act codified
judicial practice and introduced a duty to give reasons. 180 In a first phase,
this procedural guarantee was understood in a rather legalistic way, and
courts firmly linked it to the protection of individual rights. 181 According to
this approach, the duty to give reasons permits one to interpret government
decisions, makes judicial review possible, and protects the rights of the
citizens. The idea was referred to as lafunzione garantistica della motivazione.
The general rules for participation give the relevant rights only to those
"directly affected" by the administrative action. 182
The Act explicitly exempts "normative acts and those of general
180. Legge 7 agosto 1990, n. 241 (It.) [Italian Administrative Procedure Act]. For an
English translation, see The Italian Administrative Procedure Act Law: Law N 241 dated 7 August
1990, 2010 ITALIANJ. OF PUB. L. 371, 371-405 (2010).
181. For example, in some decisions the Consiglio di Stato stated that the reasons are
given to the persons affected by the act, and not to others or the generality of the population. See
Cons. Stato, sez. v, 30 aprile 2002, n. 2290 (It.); see also Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 29 aprile 2002,
n. 2281 (It.).
182. SeeL. n. 241/1990 art. 7, 9 (It.).
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application."' 183 The exemption codifies the prior case law based on claims
that such acts are "largely discretionary" or "political" in nature. They
usually do not cause direct violations of individual rights and hence do not
have to be based on reasons that are subject to judicial review. The
political nature of general normative acts is taken as a reason to exempt
them from the reason-giving obligation. 1
8 4
2. Procedural Rules and the Legitimacy Deficit of Independent Agencies
In recent years, courts and the legal literature have begun to understand
procedural mechanisms in a more nuanced manner. In addition to the
funzione garantistica, they now stress that both the duty to give reasons and
rights of participation enhance administrative accountability and
competence.185 A recent decision of the Constitutional Court acknowledges
the constitutional status of the duty to give reasons, linking it not only to the
constitutional provision that guarantees the redress for violations of
individual rights, but also to the constitutional principle of a "good and
impartial administration."18 6
The trend produced clear results for economic regulation. Specific
statutes require reason-giving for the normative and generic acts issued by
independent authorities in areas such as energy and gas,
telecommunications, and financial regulation. 187 Administrative courts
have asserted that the duty to give reasons is widespread for regulatory
decisions. 188 The judges argue that the combination of normative powers
and independence from the central government makes agency
policymaking democratically problematic. Rather than condemn the
practice, they instead require that agencies publicly justify their actions. 189
183. See L. n. 241/1990 art. 3 (It.).
184. The exemption contrasts with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, art. 296, Dec. 13, 2007 OJ. 1 (C53) (describing broad obligations, but only for EU
provisions).
185. See Eduardo Chiti, La Dimensione Funzionale del Procedimento, in LE AMMINISTRAZIONI
PUBBLICHE TRA CONSERVAZIONE E RIFORME 211 (2008) (referring to the "triple goal" of
the intervention of citizens in administrative procedure: participation, cooperation, and
defense).
186. Art. 113. Costituzione [Cost.] (It.); see Corte costituzionale [Corte Cost.], 5
novembre 2010, n. 310 (It.).
187. See Legge 28 dicembre 2005, n. 262, art. 23 (financial sector); L. n. 481/1995
(regulation of public utilities). See also Decreto Legge 1 agosto 2003, n. 259 (It.).
188. See, e.g., Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 11 aprile 2006, n. 2007; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 20 aprile
2006, n. 2201; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 27 dicembre 2006, n. 7972; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 2
maggio 2006, n. 2448; Cons. Stato sez. vi, 14 marzo 2006, n. 1409.
189. Monica Cocconi, La Motivazione Degli Atti Generali Delle Autoritd Indipendenti e la Qualita
Della Regolazione, OSSERVATORIO SULL'ANALiSI DI IMPATTO DELLA REGOLAZIONE (2011),
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Reason-giving is a partial compensation for the so-called deficit of
legitimacy that affects independent agencies. 190
In addition, the agencies provide generous rights of participation,19, and
these rights are enforced by the Courts. 192 Thus, in a 2006 case, the
Consiglio di Stato annulled a rule passed by the Autoritd Energia Ellettrica e
Gas (AEEG) because it violated procedural guarantees. The administrative
court observed that the AEEG did not uphold the participation rights of a
company that challenged the rule, and that the AEEG did not take into
consideration the comments made by companies during the process that
preceded the passage of the rule. Here, the Consiglio di Stato explicitly
confirms the importance of the rights of participation as a way to make the
authority better informed and more accountable. 193
In the domain of regulatory agencies, both the duty to give reasons and
the rights of participation are further reinforced by the obligation to
perform a regulatory impact assessment before promulgating a
regulation. 194 Italian regulatory impact assessment is connected to the
consultazione procedure, inspired by American notice-and-comment
rulemaking. The actual procedure varies for each economic sector, 195 but
available at www.osservatorioair.it. See also Bruti Liberati, La regolazione dei mercati energetici tra
l'autoritd per l'energia elettrica e il gas e il governo, RIv. TRIM. DIR. PUBBL. 435 (2009); Marcello
Clarich, Le Autoritd Indipendenti Nello "Spazio Regolatorio": L'ascesa e il Declino del Modello, DIR.
PUBBL. 1035 (2004); Stefano Baccarini, Motivazione ed Effettivitd Della Tutela, 2007 FORO
AMMINiSTRATIVO T.A.R. 3315 (2007).
190. Some authors talk about a "legitimacy filter." See M. CLARICH,
AUTORITA'INDIPENDENTI: BILANcIo E PROSPETTIVE DI UN MODELLO 154 (2005). Barra
Caracciolo refers to a "democratic 'relegitimation' in the form of 'direct democracy."' L.
Barra Caracciolo, I Procedimenti Davanti alle Autoritd Amministrative Indipendenti tra Diritto Interno e
Diritto Comunitaio, QuAD. CONS. STATO 81 (1999). Moris Foglia, I Poteri Nonnative Delle
Autoritd Amministrative Indipendenti, 26 QUADERNI REGIONALI 559 (2008); MICHELE PASSARO,
LE AMMINISTRAZIONI INDIPENDENTI 250 (1996).
191. See Sveva del Gatto, La Partecipazione ai Procedimenti di Regolazione delle Autoith
Indipendenti, 9 GIORNALE DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO 947, 949 (2010).
- 192. See, e.g., Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 2 marzo 2010, n. 1215. In another case, the Consiglio
di Stato suggested that the rights of participation also have a constitutional status, stemming
from Article 97 of the Italian Constitution. See Cons. Stato, sez. v, 18 novembre 2004, n.
7553.
193. See Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 27 dicembre 2006, n. 7972. See also Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 1
ottobre 2002, n. 5105; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 11 aprile 2006, n. 2007; Cons. Stato, 8 luglio
2008, n. 5026; TAR Lazio, 10 aprile 2002, n. 3070; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 10 ottobre 2002, n.
5105. The Consiglio di Stato affirms that "una regolazione che venga disposta senza
contraddittorio con i soggetti interessai... non pu6 che dirsi viziata."
194. Legge 29 lugio 2003, n. 229, art. 12 (It.) (establishing the obligation to promote a
regulatory impact assessment for independent administrative authorities).
195. See, e.g., CODICE DELLE COMUNICAZIONI ELETTRONICHE, Decreto Legislativo 1
agosto 2003, n. 259 (It.); CODICE DELLE ASSICURAZIONI PRIVATE, D.Lgs. n. 209/2005 (It.);
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generally consists of (i) the publication of a notice opening the procedure;
(ii) the publication of a draft regulation; (iii) the establishment of a deadline
for the presentation of comments; and (iv) the adoption of the final rule.
Stakeholders and, indeed, anyone concerned with the policy have an
opportunity to be heard and, through their participation, can help the
agencies to assess the impact of the proposed regulation. The agencies
must state the reasons for the rules they adopt and in doing so must refer to
the comments received. 196 The adoption of a regulatory impact assessment
obligation is linked to the need to promote good regulation. 19 7 Regulatory
quality is linked to participation. 198 The process, however, is a rather
recent addition so the quality of the assessments and their actual effects
should be carefully studied.
3. Efficiency v. Accountabiliy: The Doctrine ofMotivazione Postuma
The Italian courts are evolving toward procedural guarantees, such as
the duty to give reasons and the rights of participation. They have moved
from a strictly legal orientation concerned with the protection of rights to
one that also acknowledges administrative accountability and efficiency. It
is thus important to consider how Italian law reacts to situations where
these two goals are at odds.
A conflict can arise if an administrative authority wishes to amend the
reasons for its actions when it is challenged in court. As seen above, in
American law the Chenery doctrine holds that "the grounds upon which an
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record
discloses that its action was based."' 199 Italian case law, in contrast, is not
clear on whether officials can amend their reasons before the courts. The
traditional and still dominant orientation does not allow so-called
"posthumous reasons" (motivazione postuma). Reasons given by agencies
CODICE DEI CONTRATTI PUBBIUCI RELATIVI A LAvoRI, SERVIZI E FORNITURE, D.Lgs. n.
163/2012; D.Lgs. n. 262/2005 (establishing the procedure to be followed by the Consob,
ISVAP and Banca d'Italia). See also AUTORITA PER L'ENERGIA ELETTRiCA ED IL GAS, LINEE
GUIDA SULL'INTRODUZIONE DELL'ANALISI DI IMPATTO DELLA REGOLAZIONE (2005).
196. See Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 27 dicembre 2006, n. 7972.
197. Italian authors usually refer to Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) recommendations as having a strong influence on legislative drafters.
Among the documents cited are RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE OECD ON
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION (1995); REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS: BEST PRACTICE IN OECD COUNTRIES (1997); and GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
REGULATORY QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE (2005).
198. See Edoardo Chiti, La disciplinaprocedurale della regolazione, 54 RiVISTA TRIMESTRALE
Di DIRITTo PUBBLICO 700 (2004) (It.).
199. Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1942).
2014]
ADMLNISTRATIVE A WREVIEW
when they issue decisions would thus bind them before the reviewing
court.200 However, under the influence of recent procedural reforms,
courts are progressively adopting the opposite approach.2 01 An amendment
to the Italian Administrative Procedure Act sought to avoid annulments on
"mere formal grounds." According to this provision, administrative
decisions should be upheld when their content would not be different in the
absence of such formal irregularities.
202
The new orientation has the effect of avoiding useless annulments, and
thus enhances efficiency. However, its prevalence could discourage
agencies from putting much effort into articulating the reasons for their
decisions, given that those reasons can be amended or reformed before the
courts. The practice lowers government accountability to the public
because the reasons it gives up front could be adjusted ex post to suit the
court. Reason-giving ought not to be seen as a mere formal requirement.
C. Comparion between the United States and Itab
Both the United States and Italy have quite robust notice-and-comment
procedures for rulemaking, although the Italian coverage is much
narrower. Both countries justify these procedures as a way to further both
democratic legitimacy and high quality regulation. Neither limits
procedural concerns to the protection of individual rights, although that is
obviously an additional justification, especially in adjudications.
In the United States, the notice-and-comment provisions of the APA
apply to any federal agency that makes rules, including independent
agencies. There is no distinction in the rulemaking processes required for
agencies that are under the President and those with independent, multi-
member boards. In contrast, notice-and-comment provisions only apply to
Italian independent agencies, not to rules made inside cabinet departments.
The justification for this distinction is a concern for the democratic
legitimacy of independent agencies. Procedural guarantees can make
agencies both more transparent, by stating the reasons for their actions, and
200. See Cons. Stato, sez. v, 14 aprile 2006, n. 2085 ("Va escluso che la motivazione del
prowedimento impugnato possa essere integrata o sostituita in giudizio, per l'evidente
ragione che non & possibile riferire le nuove considerazioni come presenti all'organo
amministrativo nel momento in cui stata decisa la misura de qua."). See also Cons. Stato,
sez. iv, 16 settembre 2008, n. 4368; Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 07 maggio 2007, n. 1975; Cons.
Stato, sez. iv, 29 aprile 2002, n. 2281.
201. See, e.g., Cons. Stato, sez. v, 9 ottobre 2007, n. 5271; TAR, sez. ii, 8 maggio 2006, n.
1173.
202. Legge 11 febbraio 2005, n. 15, art. 2 (It.) (amending Legge 7 agosto 1990, n. 241,
art. 21).
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more responsive, by receiving public input and taking those views into
consideration, hence improving their public legitimacy. However, it is not
clear why rules issued by cabinet ministries should be less well-justified or
less open to public participation. To make that case, one would have to
have a high level of trust in the ability of the legislature to monitor the
output of the government combined with confidence that the legislature
itself is a reliable conduit for citizen concerns.
203
Except for its independent agencies, Italy is closer to the cases of Canada
and France discussed below, where the political and policy nature of
government and agency policymaking limits both procedural mandates and
court review. Yet, there is a paradox here. Why should the political nature
of the government's decision exempt it from having to carry out open-
ended hearings and to explain the reasons behind policy initiatives? Part of
the reason is a distrust of the courts' ability to carry out a modest review of
process without stepping in and dictating policy. That is a real concern-
one that is especially salient if the courts themselves extend their oversight
in the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions. The advantage of
the U.S. model-even though it is based on a statute, not the
Constitution-is that is gives the courts a text with which to orient their
review. Such a text would be desirable if the Italian state wishes to move
toward more judicial review of policymaking processes while avoiding too
much judicial activism.
D. Canada
We now turn to the review of process in Canada and France. In both
systems rulemaking is not often subject to procedural oversight by the
courts, and procedural review of adjudication concentrates on the
protection of rights.
Procedural requirements are uncommon in Canadian federal legislation
that covers rulemaking and adjudication. Lacking legal texts, the courts
approach each type of agency action differently. For adjudication, the
courts use a contextualized test that varies procedural rights according to
the circumstances of the case. Conversely, for rulemaking, the courts
203. The exemption of cabinet ministries seems to be based on the idea of electoral
accountability. Because the government was elected, its actions are therefore legitimate and
no reasons need to be given. This is certainly one way of ensuring the democratic legitimacy
of administration, but should not necessarily be the only one, nor is it the most effective.
Reason-giving is important both to the minority and the majority. In short, even though the
reasons for a duty to give reason are clearer in the context of independent agencies (which
lack even this form of electoral accountability), they are also relevant for the central
administration.
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consistently refuse to review procedural aspects.
I
1. Adjudication: "Implied Procedural Obligations"
Canada does not have a federal administrative procedure act that
establishes the procedure to be followed for administrative adjudications.
However, courts have long enforced a "duty of procedural fairness." The
leading case is Nicholson v. Halimand-Nofolk Regional Police Commissioners.204 It
concerned the dismissal of an employee, Nicholson, from a county's
regional police force. The police force did not give him a hearing before
his termination and it did not state any reasons for his dismissal. The
employer claimed only that Nicholson was still in his probationary period
and that the relevant legislation permitted discretionary terminations in
such cases.
Departing from its previous formalistic orientation,205 the Canadian
Supreme Court stated that the procedural rights of citizens before
administrative agencies stem from the "duty of procedural fairness," which
is variable and depends upon the specific context of each case. In this case,
the Court stated that Nicholson should have been heard and should have
been given reasons, due to the serious consequences resulting from the
administration's decision. 206 Thus, the duty to give reasons was a key
aspect of procedural fairness, not to aid the court or to enhance public
accountability, but rather to ensure Nicholson's rights.207
To make its position clearer, the Canadian Supreme Court in Baker
204. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311.
205. Before the decision of the Supreme Court in Nicholson, Canadian courts enforced
procedural requirements only in cases where the decision under review was qualified as
'judicial" or "quasi-judicial" as opposed to those qualified as "legislative" or
"administrative." See, e.g., Canada Minister of Nat'l Revenue v. Coopers & Lybrand Ltd.,
[1979] 1 S.C.R. 495 (listing five non-exhaustive factors that should be considered to
determine whether the decision at hand was "judicial" or "quasi-judicial"). In such cases,
courts would apply the principle of natural justice, which was composed of the right to be
heard and the right to an unbiased decisionmaker. In Nicholson, the Canadian Supreme
Court stated that procedural rights should not depend entirely on such formal distinctions.
Whereas the traditional procedural righis could be reserved to the cases or decisions of a
judicial nature, a lesser category of procedural entitlement, which the Court referred to as a
"duty of fairness," could be applied to other decisions, particularly those affecting
individuals.
206. Audrey Macklin, Standard of Review: The Pragmatic and Functional Test, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CONTEXT 224 (Colleen Flood & Lorne Sossin eds., 2008).
207. See also, Martineau v. Matsqui Inst. Disciplinary Bd., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602
(confirming Nicholson and refusing a dichotomy between the principles of "natural justice"
and "procedural fairness," while establishing instead a continuum or spectrum of procedural
protection that depended on the context and characteristics of the decisions under review).
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explained the non-exhaustive five factors that it will use to identify implied
procedural obligations in its judgments. These are: (1) the nature of the
decision and the process used; (2) the statutory scheme; (3) the importance
of the decision to the individuals affected; (4) the legitimate expectation of
the person bringing the challenge; and (5) the procedural choices made by
the agency.2 08 The case concerned a decision of the Ministry of Citizenship
and Immigration to deport a Jamaican citizen who had four Canadian
children and was under treatment for paranoid schizophrenia. The
Canadian Supreme Court enforced a duty to give reasons, considering it a
consequence of the agency's wide discretionary powers to decide whom to
deport. Here, the Court provides limited review of substance, but requires
that reasons be given. The standard is "reasonableness simpliciter" for an
individual decision, not the more deferential test of "patent
unreasonableness."
Like Nicholson, Baker involved an individual decision, not a general policy,
and the duty to give reasons was linked to the "importance of the decision"
to the person affected by it (the third factor).2 09 These decisions will have
implications for other people in similar circumstances. However, the Court
did not tie reason-giving to the public accountability and competence of the
public administration. As part of the duty of procedural fairness, the duty
to give reasons is linked to the protection of the rights of individuals vis-a-
vis the state, rather than to the democratic legitimacy or competence of the
administration.
A recent decision of the Canadian Supreme Court, nevertheless, may be
taking a step to extend the duty to give reasons. In Dunsmuir, the Canadian
Supreme Court elaborated on the content of its new standard of
reasonableness that applies to the substantive review of administrative
decisions. The Court requires that the decision be "justiflied],
transparen[t] and intelligibple]," in addition to being within the range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible based on the facts and
law.210  Under this new regime, reasonableness is more related to the
quality of the agency's reasoning than to the outcome, that is, it is more
linked to process than to substance. Although the Court refuses to decide
among different possible outcomes, it seeks to ensure that the decision is
procedurally acceptable under its jurisprudence.
208. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817,
819. On this decision, see David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, Rethinking the
Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v. Canada, 51 U. TORONTO LJ. 193, 195-97 (2001);
Genevieve Carder, Keeping a Check on Discretion, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CONTEXT 286
(Coleen Flood & Lorne Sossin eds., 2008).
209. Baker, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, para. 25 (key holding).
210. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 47.
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In a later case, the Canadian Supreme Court confirmed that this
orientation "reinforces in the context of adjudicative tribunals the
importance of reasons, which constitute the primary form of accountability
of the decisionmaker to the applicant, to the public and to a reviewing
court." 211 The Court, thus, does not limit itself to the protection of rights.
In the context of the new reasonableness test, justifying a decision in a
transparent and intelligible way is linked to legal validity, irrespective of any
violation of individual rights.
2. Rulemaking: Few Rules and Refusal to Review
In making rules, the Canadian public administration acts both formally,
through rules and regulations, and informally, through guidelines, policies,
and directives. 212 Canadian law does not generally require participation in
federal administrative rulemaking. Only in the specific case of formal
regulations 213 must agencies abide by legally mandated procedural rules.
The various forms of informal rulemaking are not subject to any
legislatively required procedures. This is true both at the federal level and
within the provinces.
Even for formal regulations, the current participatory requirements were
established only after long hesitation. The debates date back to the 1960s,
where parliamentary commissions did not recommend the establishment of
a general participatory requirement (already in force in the United States),
on the grounds that it "would cause unnecessary delay and merely
duplicate the time already spent in informal consultation. '" 214 During the
following decades, as the American model was becoming more established,
Canadian law's resistance to participation in rulemaking began to fall. 215
211. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, para. 63.
212. Alice Woolley, Legitimating Public Policy, 58 U. TORONTO LJ. 153, 156 (2008)
(arguing that informal rulemaking is very common and can be carried out by every agency
or government ministry). Informal rulemaking is not subject to any legislatively required
procedures, either at federal level or in the provinces. Id.
213. The Federal Statutory Instruments Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-22, defines regulations as
a "statutory instrument (a) made in the exercise of a legislative power conferred by or under
an Act of Parliament, or (b) for the contravention of which a penalty, fine or imprisonment is
prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament[.] [They include] a rule, order or regulation
governing the practice or procedure in any proceedings before a judicial or quasi-judicial
body established by or under an Act of Parliament, [and] any instrument described as a
regulation in any other Act of Parliament."
214. DAVIDJ. MULLAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT AND MATERIALS 678-79
(5th ed. 2003); (citing ROYAL COMMISSION INQUIRY INTO CIVIL RIGHTS, McRUER
COMMISSION, R. No. 1, at 362). See also MAcGUIGAN COMMITTEE (1969).
215. David J. Mullan mentions three official studies during the 1970s and 1980s that
reached different conclusions from those of the McRuer Commission and the MacGuigan
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The province of Qu6bec took the lead and established a participatory
procedure for the enactment of formal regulations. According to its 1986
Regulation Act,2 16 proposed regulations must be published in the Gazette
officielle du Qugbec, after which interested parties have at least forty-five days
to submit comments.
The initiative was gradually put in place at the federal level. The
Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation and the Statutory
Instruments Act (SIA) state the current procedural requirements for the
enactment of formal regulations. 217 The procedure has several phases.
First, the administrative authority must identify the parties who are
"interested and affected" by the regulation. These parties must then be
given opportunities to take part in consultations at all stages of the
regulatory process. Then the draft regulation is published in the Canada
Gazette along with a Regulatory Impact Assessment. The draft regulation
will then be subject to analysis and comments from the public for at least
thirty days. When the regulation is issued, the agency must summarize the
results of the consultation requirement including the government's
responses, and these are also published in the Gazette. Hence, under the
Cabinet Directive, the government must justify its policy choice, but there
is no judicial review of the adequacy of the explanation. The requirement
is simply an order by the government to its own ministers. However, the
SIA does give the legislature a role. The regulation must be placed before
the relevant parliamentary committee, which can veto the regulation with a
motion of disapproval.
218
Outside of formal regulations and in the absence of legislative
requirements, Canadian courts have refused to impose procedural
obligations on agency rulemaking.2 19 The leading case of Inuit Tapirisat of
Canada established this approach in 1980.220 The case concerned a
Committee: (i) ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, RESPONSIBLE REGULATION: AN INTERIM
REPORT (1979); (ii) STANDING JOINT COMMITTEE ON REGULATIONS AND OTHER
STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, R. No. 4 (1980); (iii) HOUSE OF COMMONS SPECIAL
COMMIT-FEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, in JOHN EVANS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES,
TEXT AND MATERIALS 679-80 (5th ed., 2003).
216. Regulations Act, R.S.Q. 1986, c. R-18.1.
217. CABINET DIRECTIVE ON STREAMLINING REGULATION, available at
http://pubfications.gc.ca/collections/Colection/BT22-110-2007E.pdf; Statutory
Instruments Act, R.S.C. 1985, C8-12.
218. Statutory Instruments Act, R.S.C. 1985, C8-12, art. 19.
219. Municipal bylaws and resolutions are exceptions. Though legislative in nature,
they must comply with common law procedural principles. See DAVID PHILLIP JONES &
ANNE S. DEVILLARS, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 122-24 (4th ed. 2004).
220. Atty Gen. of Can. v. Inuit Tapirisat of Can., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735; see also Cardinal
v. Dir. of Kent Inst., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643; Knight v. Indian Head Sch. Div. No. 19, [1990]
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challenge to Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications
Commission decisions to approve a new rate structure for Bell Canada.
The challenge was filed by Inuit Tapirisat of Canada on the grounds of
denial of a fair hearing. The Canadian Supreme Court ruled that the
powers delegated to the public administration in the relevant legislation
were not explicitly limited by procedural guarantees. 22' Moreover, the
Court called the decision "legislative action in its purest form" even though
it was, of course, not voted on by the legislature.222 According to the Court,
considerations of natural justice and the duty of procedural fairness are
relevant for the review of quasi-judicial or administrative decisions, but they
do not "affect the legislative process, whether primary or delegated." 223
Some authors have contrasted this approach with that taken in
adjudication. Inuit Tapirisat is indeed very different from Nicholson,224 where
the Canadian Supreme Court enforced "implied procedural obligations"
due mainly to the effects of the decision on the individual concerned. The
different treatment was criticized in the legal literature,2 25 but it persists
today. Individualized decisions that involve policy considerations are
usually subject to procedural requirements, 226 but general decisions are free
of any such constraints unless they are classed as "regulations." Agencies
and government ministries can, at their discretion, hold public hearings or
follow certain procedural steps before passing other kinds of rules, but
1 S.C.R. 653; Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525; Wells v.
Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199.
221. In Inuit Tapirisat, the Federal Court of Appeal followed Nicholson and applied the
procedural requirements to administrative decisions of a legislative nature. This
understanding was reversed by the Supreme Court. Intuit Tapirisat, [1980] 2 S.C.R. at 760.
222. Att'y Gen. of Can. v. Inuit Tapirisat of Can., [1980] 2 S.C.R., at 754. The
exemption depends not on the nature of the body taking the decision but on the legislative
nature of the decision itself.
223. In this case the Court was making reference to a passage of Bates v. Lord
Hailsham, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1373 (Eng.).
224. Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Reg. Police Comm'rs., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311
(Can.).
225. See Genevieve Cartier, Procedural Fairness in Legislative Functions: The End of Judicial
Abstinence?, 53 U. TORONTO LJ. 217 (2003); see also Grant Huscroft, The Duy of Fairness: From
Nicholson to Baker and Bgyond, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CONTEXT 115 (Colleen Flood &
Lorne Sossin eds., 2008).
226. But see Idziak v. Canada (Minister ofJustice), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631 (holding that a
ministerial decision to extradite the applicant was "at the extreme legislative end of the
continuum of administrative decisionmaking" and denying his claim to further procedures).
In this case, however, the applicant had warranted a full extradition hearing. Alternatively,
supposedly legislative decisions can be subject to the duty of fairness if the Court finds that,
despite their formal appearance, they are restricting individual rights. See Homex Realty &
Dev. Co. v. Vill. of Wyo., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 1011.
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neither the legislature nor the courts oblige them to do so. 227 The judicial
enforcement of rulemaking procedures is thus minimal in Canada.
E. France
Like Canada, France has no general, legally enforceable procedures for
the promulgation of secondary legislation. The French constitution
explicitly permits the executive to issue decrees and ordinances, and it
permits the executive to issue legally binding instruments in many areas
even without a statutory mandate.2 28 These procedures are not subject to
any generic participation or reason-giving requirements. There is no
statute like the United States' APA to provide a procedural framework for
rulemaking. The only procedural mandate is the requirement that the
Conseil d'Etat review draft decrees and ordinances.
Traditionally, the duty to give reasons has been particularly restricted in
France for both rules and adjudications. 229 At present, there are a few
moves in the direction of legally enforceable participation rights, but both
the Conseil d'Etat and the Conseil Constitutionnel have consistently
refused to recognize a general obligation to provide reasons for
administrative decisions in the absence of a statutory provision. If
applicable, the obligation is tied to the protection of rights and especially to
adjudications where the outcome for the individual is particularly
burdensome.
Recently, however, the Conseil Constitutionnel has held that there is a
right to participate in environmental policymaking. To comply with that
ruling, France passed a law at the end of 2012 setting up a participatory
process for environmental rules and regulations. In addition, the Conseil
d'Etat has examined procedures and found them wanting in a few cases
outside of the environmental area. It has done this in spite of a general
practice of overlooking procedural irregularities that do not affect the
outcome.
1. The Duy to Give Reasons under Statutoy Provisions
Absent specific statutory provisions, 230 the only decisions that have to be
227. Some agencies nevertheless voluntarily follow some procedures before making
rules. Those procedures involve, for example, internal consultation, public hearings, and
consultations with stakeholders. See Alice Wooley, Legitimating Public Policy 58 U. TORONTO
L.J. 153 (2008).
228. 1958 CONST. art. 34, 37 (Fr.).
229. See CE Sect., Jan. 26, 1973, RequEte n. 87890 ; see also Conseil d' Itat, Oct. 21,
1988, Requfte n. 91916.
230. Specific statutory provisions can also derogate this general rule. For example, the
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explained by public officials are (i) those which derogate a law or a
regulation; and (ii) some unfavorable decisions.2 31 The seven types of
unfavorable decisions232 that must be explained include those that inflict a
sanction, 233 restrict civil liberties (liberts publiques),234 or derogate previous
decisions that had conferred individual rights.2 35 General rules, favorable
decisions, and decisions falling outside the statutory list are free from the
duty to give reasons unless a particular statutory provision applies.
2 36
To decide whether a decision is "unfavorable," courts take into
consideration its impact on the person or firm to which it is directed.2 37 For
example, if a government agency assigns a license for the use of radio
frequencies to an applicant, it does not have to provide a statement of
reasons because the decision is beneficial to the firm, even though other
companies interested in competing for the license could have been harmed
by the choice. 238 However, the Conseil d'Etat sees this obligation as a way
to protect rights and to allow for judicial challenges. It is not connected to
more general ideas of transparency and political legitimacy. The Conseil
d'ltat has stated that, where reason-giving is required, the agency should
include all elements of fact and law "to enable the affected person to
challenge their legality."
239
Code des J2trangers provides a derogation concerning refusals of entry visas into France. Code
des Etrangers [C. Civ.] art. L211-2-1 (Fr.); see also CE Sect., July 25, 2008, Requte n.
305697.
231. See, e.g., Loi 79-587 du 11 juillet 1979 de relative 5 la motivation des actes
administratifs et 5 l'amdlioration des relations entre l'administration et le public [Law 1979-
587 of June 11, 1979 on the Motivation of Administrative Acts and Improving Relations
between the Administration and the Public]; see also Conseil d'Etat (CE), July 30, 1997,
Requfte n. 153402.
232. See Loi 79-587 du 11 juillet 1979 de relative A motivation des actes administratifs et
A l'am~lioration des relations entre l'administration et le public [Law 79-587 ofJuly 11, 1979
on Motivation of Administrative Acts and Improvement of Relations between the
Administration and the Public], at Art. I.
233. Conseil d'ltat (CE), Jan. 30, 2008 Requte n. 297828, St6 Laboratoires Mayoly
Spindler; Conseil d'Etat (CE), Dec. 19, 1990, Requfte n. 85669.
234. Conseil d'Etat Sect.,June 17, 1983, Requte n. 28115; e.g., Gaz. Pal. 1984, 2, 34.
235. Conseil d'Etat (CE),June 17, 1988, Requte n. 30673.
236. See Conseil d'Etat (CE)July 7, 2000, Requte n. 205842.
237. See, e.g., Conseil d'Etat (CE) Sect., Dec. 9, 1983, Requte n. 43407, e.g., D. 1984.
AJ. 81; Conseil d'tat (CE), Apr. 29, 2002, Requ~te n. 235000, Chambre des mfiers de
Haute-Corse.
238. Conseil d'Etat (CE) Apr. 30, 2007, Requte n. 286348, Ass'n. Magnum Radio. The
same problem is pointed out by Jean-Louis Autin, La Motivation des Actes Administratifs
Unilatdraux, Entre Tradition Nationale et tvolution des Droits Europiens, 137 REv. FRANQAISE
D'ADMINISTRAION PUBLIQUE 85 (2011).
239. Conseil d'ltat (CE) May 18, 1998, Requte n. 182244, St6 World Satellite
Guadeloupe.
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The Conseil Constitutionnel has also ruled that it is not possible to
extract a general duty to give reasons from constitutional rules or
principles.2 4° Like the Conseil d'Etat, it has not recognized executive
reason-giving as an essential feature of republican government under its
mandate. French law has been criticized by scholars who find the lack of a
general duty to give reasons to be "a hardly justifiable archaism" 241 or as
posing a threat of "anachronistic authoritarianism. '" 242 However, even
under EU law reason-giving only applies to cases involving individuals, not
to broad policymaking. The focus is on rights, not accountable and
competent policymaking.
2. The "Substitution of Reasons" and "Overabundant Reasons"
The doctrines of the "substitution of reasons" and "overabundant
reasons" add to the problem. Although praiseworthy from the point of
view of efficiency, those doctrines create further incentives to limit the
transparency of executive policymaking.
In France, reasons given by agencies when they issue decisions do not
bind them before the reviewing court. They can ask for the "substitution of
reasons" (substitution des motfs) while the suit is still pending. 243 Hence, the
judge can correct the legal ground of a decision, instead of annulling it.244
In most cases, the substitution is requested by the administration. 245
However, judges can also make the switch on their own initiative.246 The
judge can substitute either the legal grounds (base lgale, for example, specific
legislative provisions) or the legal reasoning (motifs) of the challenged
decision. The French model resembles the orientation that Italian courts
are starting to apply under the influence of recent procedural reforms. Our
critique of the Italian case applies here as well: even though the doctrine of
the "substitution of reasons" has the effect of avoiding useless annulments-
and thus enhances efficiency-it also discourages agencies from putting
much effort into articulating the reasons for their decisions, given that those
240. Conseil constitutionnel decision No. 2004-497DC,July 1, 2004,J.O. (Fr.).
241. Jean-Louis Autin, La Motivation des Actes Administratfs Unilatraux, Entre Tradition
Nationale et Lvolution des Droits Europlens, 137 REv. FRANtAISE D'ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE
85, 87 (2011).
242. JACQUELINE MORAND-DEVILLER, COuRS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 403 (11 th ed.
2009).
243. Contrast this with the Cheney doctrine in American law. See supra notes 156-57 and
accompanying text).
244. CE Sect., Dec. 3, 2003, Requte n. 240267.
245. Conseil d'Etat (CE) Dec. 19, 2008, Requte n. 294357, Ministre Economie,
Finances et Industrie.
246. Conseil d'Etat Sect., Sept. 27, 2006, Requte n. 260050.
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reasons can always be amended or reformed before the courts.
Furthermore, the practice lowers government accountability to the public
because the reasons the agency gives up front can be adjusted ex post to suit
the court.
In addition to.-being able to rule on the basis of substitute reasons, a
French judge can also apply the so-called thgorie des motifs surabondantes. This
doctrine is applied when a multiplicity of reasons is given by the
administration (pluralit des motifs), and only some are illegal. The judge can
disregard the illegal reasons and maintain the decision so long as the
remaining reasons are sufficient.2 47 The judge thus has the power to
evaluate the illegal reasons given by the administration as either "decisive"
or "overabundant" (surabondantes).248 One can apply the same reasoning as
in the doctrine of the substitution of reasons. Even though this doctrine has
the effect of avoiding useless annulments, it might undermine government
accountability. Indeed, the application of the doctrine gives agencies an
incentive to supply multiple reasons as a way of increasing the chances of
avoiding eventual annulments. Multiple and inaccurate reasons can be as
detrimental to accountability as no reasons at all.
3. New Developments2
49
Traditionally public involvement in government decisions was limited to
the inquest that is required for 'large public and private projects such as port
developments, highways, and shopping centers. The inquest is mostly an
exercise in elite oversight, but it requires that the project plan be available
to the affected public so that it can comment. There is no active
participation and no reason-giving requirement, although reason-giving
'may be part of any subsequent administrative court case. The ultimate
decision is in tle hands of a Commissaire or a committee closely tied to the
national government. Recent requirements to include environmental and
social impacts may be having some effect on public accountability, but the
structure of the inquest implies that the effect will be limited. 250
In response to criticisms of the inquest for coming too late in the process
247.. See Conseil d'Etat (CE) Jan. 12, 1968, Requfte n. 70951, Ministre Economie et
Finances.
248. See Conseil d'Etat (CE), Jan. 12, 1968, Dame Perrot, e.g., D. 1968 AJ. 179;
Conseil d'Etat Sect., Apr. 22, 2005, Cne de Barcar&s, e.g., D. 2005 AJ. 16321.
249. This section summarizes material in Rose-Ackerman & Perroud, supra note 131, at
253-272.
250. Ctcile Blatrix, La Dmocratie Participation en Reprisentations, 74 SOCIETES
CON'EMPORAINES 97, 104-05 (2009), available at http://www.cairn.info/revue-societes-
contemporaines-2-9-2-page-97.htm. See also Y. J~gouzo, Principe et ideologie de la participation,
in MELANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE MICHEL PRIEUR 577-78 (2007).
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to affect the decision, France created a National Commission on Public
Debate that organizes public consultation processes at the regional and
local level for large projects. These consultations produce
recommendations but do not require the ultimate decisionmaker to use
material from the public debate. The Conseil d'Etat has ruled that certain
projects cannot go forward without a consultation, but it does not judge the
quality of the debate. Furthermore, the law does not impose a reason-
giving requirement on the project sponsor.2 51 Outside of the legally
mandated arenas, governments at all levels have organized public
consultations that may be limited to named "stakeholders" or open to all
with an interest in the policy topic. These, however, are purely voluntary
initiatives spurred by political calculations that heightened input will
produce more politically acceptable policy.
However, a potentially important legal development is occurring in the
environmental field. In 2008 the Constitution was amended to give the
Conseil Constitutionnel the ability to rule on rights violations. The Conseil
Constitutionnel began to exercise this new jurisdiction in March 2010.
Previously, it could only review statutes before their promulgation to check
on their constitutionality. Now, either the Cour de Cassation or the
Conseil d'Etat can refer such constitutional issues to the Conseil
Constitutionnel. The limit to rights violations might seem to rule out cases
that challenge administrative policymaking processes. However, in the
environmental area, the Conseil Constitutionnel has taken a broad view of
its jurisdiction. The French Constitution includes a Charter for the
Environment, and Article 7 of the Charter gives individuals a right to
participate in environmental policymaking. In a series of cases beginning in
fall 2011, the Conseil Constitutionnel enforced this right and voided parts
of several environmental statutes as lacking sufficient opportunity for broad
251. See Rose-Ackerman & Perroud, supra note 131, at 258-260. Loi 95-101 du 2 fkvrier
1995 de relative au renforcement de la protection de l'environnement [Law 95-101 of Feb.
2, 1995 on strengthening the protection of the environment],J. OMCIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANcAISE U.0.], 3 fdvrier 1995, No. 29. The law created an independent National
Commission on Public Debate (CNDP), established in 1997, to organize the debates. In
2002 its mandate was broadened to include socio-economic and development impacts as
well as environmental effects. Loi 2002-276 du 27 f~vrier 2002 relative . la dfmocratie de
proximit6 [Law 2002-276 of Feb. 27, 2002 on Local Democracy], J. OFFICIEL DE LA
RIPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE .0.], 28 ffvrier 2002. For background material consult the
website of the CNDP, available at http://www.debatpublic.fr/. The history of the CNDP is
summarized at http://www.debatpublic.fr/cndp/rappel historique.html. See also Blatrix,
supra note 249, at 106-07; Cfcile Blatrix, Gense et Consolidation D'une Institution: Ie D'bat Public
en France, in; LE DEBAT PUBLIC : UNE EXPERIENCE FRANQAISE DE DEMOCRATIE
PARTICIPATIVE 43-56 (2007).
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public participation. 252 The Conseil Constitutionnel did not explain what
types of participation would satisfy the constitutional provision, but it
aggressively signaled that the government must implement environmental
laws using participatory methods. This constitutional right only involves
environmental issues, but the background justifications for broad
participation have a wider reach. It remains to be seen whether the Conseil
Constitutionnel will limit its jurisprudence to the environment where a
textual hook exists, or whether it will reach further. Alternatively, strong
participation rights in the environmental field may push advocates in other
policy areas to demand expanded participation.
In response to the Conseil Constitutionnel decisions, France amended its
environmental statutes. A law passed in December 2012 sets up a structure
for public participation in environmental policymaking that is a direct
response to these decisions. 253 The law is a modified version of US-style
notice-and-comment rulemaking. When it makes policy, the government
must publish a proposal that explains the policy's context and objectives;
the proposal is then open to public comment, and the final decision must be
accompanied by a document that summarizes the comments and explains
which ones were taken into account. The law, however, takes a quite
limited view of participation, and it reflects a certain hesitation on the part
of the government to open up the process. A list of forthcoming policy
decisions will be published every three months; the minimum time for
comments is short, only three weeks; and the minimum time between the
end of the comment period and the issuance of the final decision is four
days. The law requires that the government authority make public a
summary of the comments.2 54 One provision also sets up an eighteen-
month experiment under which all comments will be immediately made
public on the internet so as to encourage discussion.
2 55
252. The first case is Ass'n France Nature Environnement, Conseil constitutionnel
decision No. 2011-183/184QPC, Oct. 14, 2011, available at www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision/201 1/2011183 184qpc.htm. The subsequent cases are Conseil
constitutionnel decision No. 2012-262QPC,July 13, 2012; Conseil constitutionnel decision
No. 2012-269QPC, July 27, 12012; and Conseil constitutionnel decision No. 2012-
270QPC,July 27, 2012.
253. Loi 2012-1460 du 27 dcembre 2012 de relative A la mise en oeuvre du principe de
participation du public define A l'article 7 de la Charte de l'environnement [Law no. 2012-
1460 of Dec. 27, 2012 on the implementation of the principle ofpublic participation defined
in Section 7 of the Charter of the Environment], J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
U.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 28, 2012, No. 302.
254. Id. at art. 2.
255. Id. at art. 3.
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F. Comments on France and Canada
Neither Canada nor France has an administrative procedure act that
specifies required procedures for the overall production of administrative
rules and regulations. Canadian courts have developed a set of procedural
requirements for individual adjudications that are flexible and case specific;
they reflect an ideal of procedural fairness that includes an unbiased
decisionmaker and a requirement to give reasons. France has a less well-
specified body of law for adjudications; its law concentrates on official
abuses of power that violate individual rights. The strongest protections are
for state actions that impose costs on individuals.
Canada does have legally required procedures for formal regulations,
but not for rules or for various informal documents. The Canadian
government operates under the Directive on Streamlining Regulations that
imposes requirements on the ministries to balance costs and benefits and
justify their policy initiatives. However, the Directive has no legal force and
does not enhance levels of judicial review of the rulemaking process.
France does not have even this limited procedural window. Thus, not
surprisingly, secondary legislation is seldom challenged on procedural
grounds. The courts in Canada and France can review rules; in France the
key concept of an "administrative act" applies to both rules and
adjudications. However, there is little case law dealing with the policy
process, and the few cases that deal with rules, such as the recent French
cases, apply the concept of rights to these procedures. The courts in
Canada and France lack a vocabulary and a conceptual framework for
overtly taking on the task of monitoring the democratic and technical
legitimacy of policymaking inside the administration.
Given this history, current developments in French environmental law
will be especially important to study. The Conseil Constitutionnel has
taken a striking procedural turn in interpreting the Charter for the
Environment. The 2012 law is a response to the Conseil Constitutionnel's
decisions and takes tentative steps that give legal force to public
participation in government policymaking. However, the law represents a
quite modest move toward greater public input, and it risks being a merely
symbolic gesture that may satisfy the Conseil but do little to enhance the
public accountability of environmental policymaking. The short timelines
of three months and four days mean that the process risks irrelevance.
Hence, its impact will depend upon the ability of environmental groups and
concerned citizens both to use the new procedures and to assure that
government actions really do incorporate public input. The timelines are
only minimums so that the government could respond to legitimate
demands for more in-depth opportunities for public input. The role of the
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courts will be important. It remains to be seen whether the Conseil d'Etat
and the Conseil Constitutionnel will engage in review of environmental
policymaking processes in a way that could be a spur to democratic
accountability.
CONCLUSION
If courts review government decisions based on technical scientific or
economic information, judges are frequently at a disadvantage because of
their lack of expertise outside of the law. Yet these decisions require
oversight because of the risk of capture and of simple incompetence. Public
choices can lack both democratic legitimacy and technical validity, and
they can violate rights. However, courts are not equipped to provide in-
depth review of regulatory substance. Hence, our first claim is that judicial
review of the substance of executive branch policy is likely to be poorly
executed, especially in technically complex areas. The French case study
illustrates the pathologies that can arise; in contrast, Canada's deferential
review for "reasonableness" is a positive model. Concern for the protection
of individual rights has motivated the French courts, but they have carried
out their aggressive review in a way that could undermine executive
policymaking under delegated authority.
The limitations of substantive review lead us to consider judicial review
of the policymaking process. Such review needs to recognize that executive
policymaking is quite different from deciding individual adjudications in
court. Much of the academic discussion ofjudicial review in administrative
law concentrates on what is called "due process" or the processes that the
state must follow if it is to impose a cost on an individual by, for example,
taking her property, denying him a license, or levying a fine for
noncompliance with the law. These are clearly important foundations for
the protection of rights, but they are not our primary focus. Rather, as with
our discussion of substance, we concentrate on procedures that help
determine broad policies, either in the context of individual cases or in
rulemakings. Insofar as the courts concentrate only on conventional due
process protections and fail to check the adequacy of broader policy
processes, they risk limiting the democratic legitimacy of government
actions.
Leaving the protection of individual rights to one side, there are two
other fundamental reasons for courts to review the administrative
policymaking process. First, the administrative process may help the judges
themselves to understand what the government or agency has done. In
particular, the courts require that rules or adjudications be accompanied
with reasons so that they can judge if the underlying policy is in accord with
the legislative text. They act as guardians of the will of the legislature.
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Second, they monitor the administrative process not to help them decide
cases but to ensure that the policymaker is accountable to the public. Here,
accountability flows directly to the citizenry rather than indirectly through
the legislature to the voters. To the extent that the courts recognize a role
for such a direct connection between citizens, on the one hand, and
government ministries and independent agencies, on the other, judicial
review can emphasize both public participation and reason-giving. Under
this second justification, it is not important whether or not tie courts
approve of the policy, but rather whether the policy has been made in a
way that both invites broad public input and is justified in a public and
understandable way. Sometimes these alternative views of democratic
accountability-aiding the courts to uphold the legislative will and aiding
the public to hold government to account-become blurred in practice.
However, they represent distinct views of the judicial role, with the latter
stressing transparency and direct public involvement in the policymaking
process.
Rulemaking procedures are the most obvious place to look for the
intersection between policymaking and judicial review. Heavily judicialized
processes are inappropriate for multi-faceted policy issues that affect large
numbers of people and depend on specialized technical knowledge. These
decisions represent political/policy choices, but they are made by cabinet
ministers, independent agency officials, or senior bureaucrats, not by the
legislature directly. Such processes should take account of public concerns
as well as tapping into expertise outside of government. Looking across our
cases, administrative law ranges from strictly hands off, on the one hand, to
legal requirements close to those followed by the courts, on the other.
Judicial review of process tracks these alternatives, ranging from
nonexistent to a level of scrutiny approaching that of an appellate court
reviewing the decision of a lower court.
At the most intrusive pole is formal rulemaking under the United States
APA. There the procedures are identical to those for formal, on-the-record
adjudications and approximate judicial procedures. Courts can review the
agency action for conformity with these processes. This is an extreme
example of the U.S. administrative process copying judicial procedures
without much recognition of the distinctive nature of rulemaking. In
practice, formal rulemaking is seldom used. Instead the "informal" notice-
and-comment procedure of the APA is the norm, requiring notice, public
input, and reason-giving with judicial review for conformity with these
provisions. Even given the extensive gloss given to these barebones
provisions by the courts, the emphasis is on transparency, openness to
outside views, accountability, and functional policymaking, not
individualized due process rights. None of our other three case studies have
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the kind of pervasive review of rulemaking procedures common in U.S.
administrative law. Rather, they recognize the value of public participation
and reason-giving but provide judicial review in only a narrow range of
cases, leaving it to political and bureaucratic actors to structure most
policymaking exercises absent judicial oversight.
In some countries, courts understand that their decisionmaking template
is inappropriate for policymaking. One response is for the courts to refuse
to review executive and agency rulemaking. With a few notable exceptions,
this is the situation in Canada, Italy, and France. A second response is a
limited review that concentrates on whether rulemaking processes further
democratic legitimacy and competence. This is the approach, at least in
the ideal, under the U.S. APA; although it has obviously led to sharp
disagreements among the Supreme Court justices and across the courts of
appeal over the application of these principles in individual cases.
Canada appears the most superficially similar to the U.S. In the United
States the APA exempts "interpretive rules" and "general statements of
policy." 256  Canada distinguishes between regulations and rules. The
former must be issued only after notice and a hearing and with a statement
of reasons, and the courts can review the adequacy of the process.
257
However, procedurally protected formal rulemaking is relatively
uncommon in Canada. Instead, the government often resorts to soft law.
The rarity of formal regulations may be a reflection of Canada's
parliamentary system where most statutes are drafted by the government.
Only in very special cases would the government want a statute to include
strict procedural protections for public input and reason-giving. They may
choose to engage in such practices if they are politically expedient, but if
they are not, there is no legal way to constrain the government to act
otherwise.
Italy is also a parliamentary system so a similar empirical argument
would suggest that Italy would not have judicially enforceable rulemaking
procedures, and indeed that is so as a general matter. However, there is
one important exception. Under pressure from EU directives, Italy has
privatized a number of formerly state-run public utilities. Because these
firms retain considerable monopoly power, the Italian state created
independent agencies to regulate these industries. This raised an issue of
political accountability. The agencies needed to be independent of the rest
of the state because some firms were still partly state-owned and also
256. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
257. See, e.g., Enbridge and Union Gas v. Ontario Energy Bd. (2005), 74 O.R. 3d 147
(C.A.) (where the applicants claimed that the Ontario Energy Board did not comply with the
notice-and-comment requirements established in the Ontario Energy Board Act).
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because of a fear that regulation would be used for political ends.
However, the opposite concern was that the agency would be captured by
the large firms it was supposed to be regulating with little recourse for the
state. One response was to require these independent agencies to be more
directly responsive to the public by requiring public consultation and
reason-giving. However, because they are understood as a way to
compensate for the "deficit of accountability" of independent agencies,
these procedural requirements only apply to such agencies. In Italy, rules
made by the core executive are exempt from any similar procedural
requirements. This option expresses an excessive trust in electoral
accountability. Because the rules passed by the core executive are
responsive to the political interests of the government in power, incumbents
see the pressure for external input as unnecessary to ensure political
accountability.
France is similar to Italy and Canada in having no general legally
enforceable provisions for public participation and reason-giving. Even in
those cases where procedures are legally required, the courts will not
enforce them unless they judge that procedural violations could have
affected the outcome. Yet, there is increased interest in publicly
accountable policymaking in France. One recent law requires ministries to
accept comments when they make policy; however, as yet, the process is
untested and the role of the courts is unclear. A second sets up
participatory processes for environmental policies. The EU is pushing for
more participation and openness in the new independent regulatory
agencies, much as in Italy.
Less transparent and more difficult to study are situations where broad
policies are made through a series of adjudications. Here the procedures
are often similar to those used in courts and the broader public policy
implications of the individual decisions may be difficult or impossible to
raise, either in the agency or in court. The agency may recognize that it is
de facto making policy, but all it has to do procedurally is protect the rights
of individual people and firms by, for example, giving them a hearing and
an opportunity to cross-examine opponents. Nevertheless, the parties to a
dispute before the agency may not represent the broader public
interest. Can the courts require the agency to move beyond court-like
adversarial processes to take account of civil society or other interest group
concerns? This seldom happens even in the U.S. with its strong
commitment to accountable rulemaking processes. To some extent the
U.S. Supreme Court dealt with this issue in Overton Park v. Volpe where it
imposed certain procedural requirements on informal adjudications not
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covered by the APA.258 However, that case dealt with an individual
highway siting decision, not overall highway policy.
Putting together the limits of substantive review and the promise of
procedural review of policymaking, and considering the goal of balancing
the three aspects of state legitimacy through the courts, France appears to
have the worst combination of our four cases. It has very aggressive review
of substance and weak review of process. Italy comes next. Although its
courts also engage in aggressive review of substance, it offers a greater
review of process, at least in the context of independent agencies. As noted
above, this does not mean that the French and Italian approaches to
judicial review are problematic overall. However, they privilege the
protection of legal rights to the detriment of other goals, such as
administrative efficiency, technical competence, and political
accountability. Canada has found a good balance for review of substance
but lacks review of rulemaking procedures, except for the cases of formal
regulation. The United States has a rather inconsistent record on the
review of substance, but its relatively deferential judicial practice places it
just behind Canada. On judicial review of the rulemaking process it
dominates the other cases in its explicit concern for the democratic
legitimacy of delegated policymaking. However, this favorable view is
conditioned by the time consuming nature of the process, which delays the
implementation of important rules.
The decision to adopt procedural requirements that further state
legitimacy is just a first step. A further discussion concerns the actual
procedures required. Who should be given the opportunity to participate?
If participation is restricted to interested parties, how should they be
defined? How can we ensure that some (better organized, better financed)
groups will not dominate the consultation process? How can participation
be designed to avoid excessive cost and delay? The answer to these and
other questions will help to balance democratic responsiveness with the
other conflicting goals of administrative law.
258. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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